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Abstract  
The Indo-Pakistani rivalry has lasted for more than seven decades, experienced four major wars, countless 
armed skirmishes and extensive cross-border communal violence, resulting in more than one million 
casualties, and enormous amounts of resources diverted towards security. The disputed Kashmir region is 
often cited as the main reason for the persistence of the conflict. However, due to environmental stress 
and population increase, the influence of water-politics, as either a source of conflict- or cooperation, are 
gaining more analytical attention. Unquestionably, South-Asian policy-makers are increasingly linking 
environmental problems with national security;; thereby inevitably militarize the contextual discourses. As 
recent research show, elements of Indian and Pakistani political elites alike have vested interests in 
maintaining the hostile relationship, a relationship which diverts responsibilities in domestic 
(mis)management while also consolidating political power by preserving existing threat perceptions. How 
does this manifest in on-going water disputes? Securitization Theory argues that by discursively framing- or 
?securitizing?? ???????? issues, policy makers gain political momentum through the popular acceptance of 
implementing extraordinary means, which consequently removes institutional checks and balances while 
diverting attention away from domestic problems. This thesis aimed to explain these processes - and the 
underlying motivating dynamics - in one contemporary water conflict: the Indo-Pakistani Baglihar Dam 
dispute. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 Forewords ? ?????????????????????????????-?????? 
In any research, the initial task is to position the study so that readers understand the ????????? ???????????
????????? ??????? et al. 2014: 61). Therefore, the following section will set the stage by highlighting key 
elements of the Indo-Pakistani conflict, while briefly explaining the concept of hydro-politics and the 
seemingly increasing securitization of South-Asian water-disputes.  
 
The seven decade long confli??? ???????? ?????? ???? ?????????? ?????? ??????????? ??? ??? ?????????? ????????1 
within International Relations (IR) 
scholarship, has experienced four major 
wars2 and countless armed skirmishes 
(Misra, 2010: 9-12;; Paul, 2005: 3-5;; 
Pardesi & Ganguly, 2007: 131). It is 
frequently described as one of the most 
violent and persistent conflicts of our 
time (Khan, 2005: 160), in which the 
oppositional national identities of 
secular India and Muslim Pakistan are 
generally viewed as pivotal for 
maintaining the conflict (Nasr, 2005: 
178;; Tadjabaksh, 2011: 10, 24-25).  
 
 
 
These oppositional dynamics manifest in various disputes, all emanating from the mistrust, animosity and 
overall existential fear of one-another, thus tainting relations since Partition in 1947 (Hasan, 2005: 74;; 
                                                                                                                    
1  For  an  extensive  explanation  ??????????????????????????  concept???????????????????.      
2  Notably  the  Kashmir  Conflict  in  1947-­‐1948,  the  Indo-­‐Pakistani  wars  in  September  1965  and  1971,  and  the  Kargil  conflict  in  May-­‐July  1999  (Chari,  2003:  
2).  For  an  excellent  overview  of  the  four  wars,  see  Guha,  2007:  59-­‐83,  395-­‐399,  457-­‐463,  675-­‐678.  
Map 1: South-Asia 
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Box 1: The Partition of India 
A Majority of experts recognize the 
Partition in 1947 as the main cause for the 
current animosity between India and 
Pakistan, arguing that the very foundation 
??? ???? ???????? ??? ???????? ??? ???? ???
alternative visions of the Indian and 
????????????????????????????????????????????
135). The petition for a separate Muslim 
state originated chiefly from divisive 
colonial policies and a growing discontent 
with the Hindu community, mainly caused 
by electoral frustrations leading to fears of 
Muslim misrepresentation. Thus, instead of 
opting for separate electorates within an 
Indian state, demands for separate Muslim 
state were made (Kothari, 2009: 65-70).  
Cohen, 2013: 18;; Mir, 2014: 110). ??????????????????????????????????? as formulated by Geller (1993) and 
further developed by Paul3 (2005, 2006;; see also Alam et al. 2011: 22-23) adequately explains the persistence 
of the conflict: ???????????? ?????le, multiple conceptual definitions of inter-state rivalries are summarized. 
The historical record of the Indo-Pakistani rivalry adequately fits these definitions, having ??????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????The persistent rivalry was an outcome of both 
deliberate actions and short-sighted failures to make comprises by the respective leaders of changing India, 
emerging Pakistan, and parting Britain4. Together, these actors were at least partly responsible in the 
?????ation of a communal discourse of Hindu?Muslim relations characterized by difference [and] 
????????????????????????????? which emerged during the bloody Partition in 1947 (see Box 1). 
  
The most noticeable factors maintaining the rivalry are the 
territorial aspects and the conflicting- or contrasting 
religious/national identities inherent within the two states (Paul, 
2006: 610). Cohen (2013) explains that the conflict 
predominantly revolves around three connected geostrategic 
issues ? Kashmir, the Siachen Glacier and water (2013: 33). The 
majority of scholarship has emphasized Kashmir as the 
??chief source of conflict in the several wars fought between 
??????????????????? (Chari, 2003: 2;; see also Tadjbakhsh, 2011, 
3;; Nasr, 2005: 179 Hasan, 2005: 74) while proving a constant 
obstruction to lasting peace5 (Mcleod, 2008: 3;; Pardesi & 
Ganguly, 2007: 135-136). Nonetheless, these three issues cannot 
be strategically separated, nor can their national-symbolic 
                                                                                                                    
3  E??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????litarized  inter-­‐state  
disputes  punctuating  the  relationship  in  between  [with  a]  persistent,  fundamental,  and  long  term  incompatibi??????????????????????????????????? ???????
2005:  3-­‐4)  which  consequentially  produce  an  almost  existential  animosity  forcing  parties  to  often  view  relations  as  zero-­‐sum,  while  the  conflict  becomes  
further  entrenched  ?  or  embedded  (Paul,  2006:  602).    
4  For  an  account  of  the  political  developments  and  the  growing  dissolution  of  the  Indian  Muslism  within  colonial  India,  see  Kothari,  2009:  65-­‐70.  For  a  
related  analysis  of  the  transformation  of  a  discourse  from  demanded  inclusiveness  to  outright  separatism  from  India,  see  Nasr,  2005:  179-­‐182.        
5  ?????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-­‐LoC  fire  has  unfortunately  
become  a  barometer  of  India-­‐?????????????????????????????????????  
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meaning be detached from one-another6. While Kashmir unquestionably is essential for the rivalry, just as 
armed confrontations on the Siachen glacier have severely impeded overall relations7, the attention of this 
thesis is on the last geostrategic issue: hydro-politics8- and its exploitation by certain elite actors in Indo-
Pakistani security relations (Mustafa, 2007;; Hazarika & Mehta, 2014: 20-23).  
 
1.2 Research Question 
According to Buzan et al. (1998) the essential quality of security is the framing of existential issues as of 
imperative political priority (1998: 26). Hence, t???????????????? ????? ???not to determine the characteristics 
???? ? ????????? ??? ??? ???????????? ???????? ???? ??????? ??? ????????????? ???? processes of constructing a shared 
understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat?????????????emphasis 
added];; see also Buzan & Wæver 2003: 71). This thesis will describe the dynamics of such practices, while 
stressing the instrumental value in ?????????????? ??????????? ?his will be accomplished by highlighting 
underlying motivations for securitizing certain issues, while emphasizing the utility in this practice i.e. why 
actors attempt this process. As will be revealed, this research agenda directly translates into contemporary 
Indo-Pakistani scholarship by Bisht (2011), Tadjabaksh (2011) and Pervez (2013), researchers who all argue 
that underlying political and self-serving interests unquestionably influence securitizing actors in both 
countries. However, within their research, only scant attention to hydro-politics is given. This is where the 
thesis is situated by conducting a limited case study. In studying discourses and practices revolving one 
specific hydrological conflict, the decade long dispute over the Indian Baglihar Dam, this thesis asks: 
 
 
                                                                                                                    
6  For  instance,  the  Siachen  Glaicer  feeds  the  vital  Indus  River,  thus  making  it  a  geo-­‐strategic  water-­‐issue,  all  the  while  it  holds  symbolic  significance  as  it  
lies  within  the  disputed  region  of  Kashmir  (Khan,  2012).    
7  For  a  geo-­‐strategic-­‐  and  symbolic  analysis,    and  an  overview  of  the  costs  in  resources  and  lives,  see  Misra,  2010:  107-­‐137;  Khan,  2012.  
8  Hydro-­‐politics  can  be  understood  as  the  outcome  of  increasing  academic  attention  on  the  potential  violent  outcome  of  international  water-­‐disputes,  
?????????????????the  ability  of  geopolitical  institutions  to  manage  shared  water  resources  in  a  politically  sustainable  ????????? ???????????????  
What were the securitizing elements within the Baglihar dispute, and what 
do these reveal about the larger dynamics driving the South-Asian Hydro-
political Security Complex? 
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1.3 Environmental Stress and South-Asian Securitization   
Within hydro-political research, especially internationally shared river basins are gaining more attention, 
excelling as a notable sub-discipline within IR theory (Hogan, 2005: 2;; Wirsing, 2011: 39;; Stetter et al. 2011: 
441-442;; Burgess et al. 2013: 1). Its relevancy is evident: 148 states possess areas within international river 
basins, covering 46% of E???????????????????????-Water 2014a;; UN Water 2014b). Moreover, 40% of the 
global population lives nearby these basins (UN Water, 2008). Among many of the 250 internationally 
shared river basins conflicts are indeed intensifying, primarily driven by the decrease of freshwater 
availability and population increase (Hazarika & Mehta, 2014: 20).  
Hence, the peaceful maintenance of internationally shared rivers is unmistakably of highest importance. 
Furthermore, water will only gain more significance in the future as environmental pressures increase, 
especially on the Southern Hemisphere, mainly due to over-population and urbanization, industrialization 
and climate change (Pai, 2008: 2-3;; Jaitly, 2009: 18-19;; John, 2011: 6). Map 2 displays the water-stress level 
globally as of 2012, highlighting the global North/South disparity.  
 
  
    Map 2: Global Water Scarcity  
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Box 2: Water Index 
The influence by water resources to 
vulnerability is linked to the quantity and 
variation of water, and the pressures from 
?????? ?????????? ???? ????????? ??? ??? ???????????
???? ????????????? ???? ?????? ?????????
parameter is expressed in terms of annual 
per capita water resources available 
compared to the commonly agreed 
minimum level of per capita water 
resources required which is 1.700m3 pr. 
person (Babel & Wahid, 2008: 4;; Hazarika 
& Mehta, 2014: 26-27). Thus an area is 
??????????? ? ????-?????????? ????? ???????
supplies drop below 1.700m3 per person, 
? ????? ???????? ?????? ?????? ???? ????
?????????? ?????????? ????? ?????????? ?????? ???
lower than 500m3 (UN.org 2014).  
Hydrological theory contends that shared water-basins can cause much tension between states, and that 
especially pressures from gradual decline in water quality- and quantity potentially instigate ?? ??????-over 
??????????????????????????????????????Wolf, 2007: 19;; Wolf, et al. 2005: 81). Nevertheless, water can also play 
a crucial part in normalizing relations between hostile states if looming water-scarcity is framed as a bilateral 
threat, instead of a zero-sum scenario (Ibid. 85;; Homer-Dixon 1994;; Gleick 1999;; Price et al. 2014: vii-x.).  
 
Particular South-Asia is increasingly experiencing the effects from environmental stress, elevating especially 
???????????????? ????-?????????????????????????a national security concern 9(UNESCO, 2011: 35-37, 87-83). 
India and Pakistan alike are facing extreme rates of population growth, wide-spread poverty and fast-
declining food production coupled with a rising demand of water for domestic, agricultural and industrial 
uses?? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????;; see also John, 2011: 
2). According to the Mckinsey Report (2009), the per capital 
water availability in India has plummeted from 5.000 m3 per 
year in 1947, to less than 2.000 m3 per year in 1997, and is 
projected to drop below 1.500 in 2025 (2009: 6, 12, 19, 45). 
Moreover, instigated by population growth and growing 
domestic consumption, the demand of water will increase to 
almost 1.5 trillion m3.  ???????? ???????? ????r supply is 740 
billion m3 (Ibid. 10).  
 
Water-scarcity is similarly increasing in Pakistan (Wirsing, 
2011: 42;; Mashru, 2014) with shortages projected to increase 
by 23.51% in 2025 (Khalid et al. 2014: 268). Although receiving 
water from three different basins, the Indus Basin emanating 
from the Indian borders is of highest importance, providing 
water for 77% of the population (Bakshi & Trivedi, 2011: 3). As Alam et al. (2011) explain, the enormous 
?????????? ?????? ????????????????? ???? ?????????? ??????????????? ??????????? ??? ???????????????????? ???????
23). Moreover, as Pakistan is undeniably more dependent on the Basin than India. Recently, a considerable 
                                                                                                                    
9  Chellaney  (2013)  ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????(2013:  47;  see  also  
Chellaney,   2012:   142-­‐143;   IBWG,   2013:   20).   For   an   account   of   the   contemporary   and   prospective   effects   of   climate   change,   over-­‐population   and  
intensified  industrialization,  see  Babel  &  Wahid,  2008.    
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amount of scholars have argued that water-????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????? ?????????? ???? ???????? ????????????? ?????For instance, John (2011) explains that water will 
only play a more critical part in maintaining peace and stability in the region in the coming decades by 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????). As such, the discourses on especially international 
shared waters are becoming increasingly securitized10?? ????? ??making water appear to be a source of 
???????????????????????????????????????Price et al. 2014: 92;; see also, R. Singh, 2008: 7-8). This is certainly the 
case for India and Pakistan, being ???? ???????????????????-poor nations already while demands only rise 
due to the aforementioned environmental 
pressures11 (Khalid, 2014: 259-260). As one 
recent report foresees, Indian hydro-politics 
with Pakistan will become dominated by 
political and strategic considerations 
because water increasingly will become 
????????????? ??? ???? ???????????????? ???????
trade-off will assume predominance 
because the political stakes are high vis-à-vis 
?????????? ??????? ?????? ????? ?? ?????
contentions have been made by a range of 
scholars regarding Pakistani hydrological 
attitudes towards India (e.g. Bisht, 2011;; 
Tadkabaksh, 2011;; R. Singh, 2011;; Burgess 
et al. 2013).   
 
Since Partition India and Pakistan have indeed since Partition experienced water-related conflicts, in which 
the shared Indus River Basin (see Map 3) is the primary site of contention (Khalid et al. 2014: 264). Being 
of vital importance for both countries, the rapid decline of ???????????available water12 press populations 
and decision-makers alike, while contributing to overall inter-state tensions (Wirsing, 2011: 49;; Bagla, 2010: 
                                                                                                                    
10  On  the  rising  demand  of  water  in  Asia,  see  Chellaney,  2012:  142-­‐143;  Mashru,  R.  2014.  On  the  relation  between  water-­‐scarcity  and  increasing  conflict,  
see  Wolf,  A.T.  et  al.  2005:  81;  Hazarika,  O.B.  &  Mehta,  S.  2014:  27.    
11  India  and  Pakistan     are   in  fact  among  the  most  vulnerable  nations  globally  in  terms  of   future  climate-­‐related  impacts  (Hill,  2003:  29,  2013:  244;  see  
also,  John,  2011:  2;  Wirsing,  2011:  41-­‐42;  Chellaney,  2012:  145,  154;  2013:  55-­‐56).    
12    ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????population  of  300  million  makes  the  annual  per  capita  water  
availability  of  only  1.329  m3  (IBWG,  2013:  13-­‐????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ? ????????????????  
         Map 3: Indus Water Basin 
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1226;; Sinha et al. 2012: 735). The Indus is indeed stressed to the point that water removals far exceed 
natural rates of renewal?????????????????????????????13 (IBWG, 2013: 16). Recalling the water-scarcity-conflict 
nexus (Wolf, 2007: 19) while factoring in the dynamics of the Indo-Pakistani enduring rivalry, armed 
conflicts regarding access to- and use of water seems highly likely. Indeed this was noted in 2009 by 
numerous United Nations bodies, which warned that water had evolved into the most prominent driver 
for tensions between the two countries, hence ???????????? ?????????????????????? ?????? ??? ???? ????????????
?????????????????? ???????????????? 
 
Without doubt, South-Asian hydrological disputes are increasing, partly influenced by a recent virtual 
explosion in Indian hydrological infrastructure on the Indus (Bhutta, 2011;; Jayaram, 2013). These actions 
have placed the Indus Water Treaty (IWT), signed between the two countries in 1960 under significant 
stress (Khalid, 2014: 265-266R;; Singh, 2008: 10). Successful in smoothing post-Partition water-related 
tensions, the treaty has often been referred to as the hallmark within water-negotiations for its durability 
and effectiveness14 (Babel & Wahid 2008: 20;; Barrett, 1994: 33;; Bakshi & Trivedi, 2011: 8-9;; Kakahel, 2014: 
43-44). However, because the IWT divided the rivers between the countries, instead of institutionalizing co-
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????. 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????r-riparian anxiety-??????????????????????????????????????
all actions by India as potentially threatening (Tadjabaksh, 2011: 10-11;; Sinha et al. 2012: 742-743).  
 
The Increasing Securitization of Indo-Pakistani Hydro-Politics 
National security is increasingly being linked to the management of the declining Indus Basin, which leads 
?????????????????????????????all Indo-Pakistani hydrological relations (Veilleux et al. 2014: 8;; Alam et al. 2011: 
5). Securitization denotes the process of framing specific issues ??? ????????????? ????????????? ??? ?? ??????
?????????? ????????? consequently infusing the matter with priority and urgency, thereby legitimizing the 
implementation of extraordinary security-policies (Buzan et al. 1998;; 25-26).  Hence, securitization often 
amplify geo-strategic security dynamics thereby furthering the possibility of conflict, especially in basins 
facing closure (R. Singh, 2008: 8;; IDSA, 2010: 19;; Turton, 2003: 76).   
                                                                                                                    
13  Basin  closure  is  the  hydrological  term  for  a  basin  in  which  all  available  water  has  been  distributed  to  production,  leaving  no  more  left  to  be  allocated  
(Turton,  2003:  8,  33).  
14  The  treaty  remained  operational  during  the  1965  and  1971  Indo-­‐Pak  wars,  the  Kargil  conflict  in  2001  as  well  as  the  political  crisis  in  the  wake  of  the  
2001  Delhi  parliament-­‐  and  the  2008  Mumbai  terror  attacks  (Sinha  et  al.  2012:  735;  see  also  Kraska,  2009:  515).        
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Indeed, a recent CIA report warned that Indo-Pakistani hydrological conflicts would only increase due to 
water-scarcity (Economist, 2011). Similarly, another report argued that the aggregate effects of water-
scarcity on associated sectors (e.g. food and energy) would become key in future national security policies 
(ICA, 2012: iii). Arguably, future South-Asian conflicts will be greatly affected ?????????shift in the way a 
??????? ?????? ???????????? ?????????? et al. 2014: 10). Hydro-securitizing severely influences perceptions of 
water itself, which is arguably influential in the increasing discontent with existing institutional 
arrangements. In turn, this has caused a growing criticism of the IWT by Indian and Pakistani political 
actors alike, most rigorously by the latter due to a virtual explosion in Indian hydrological constructions 
(Hill, 2013: 251;; Bhutta, 2011;; Jayaram, 2013). As a consequence of increased securitization, policy makers 
invariably view ??????????????????????????????-???? instead of seeking mutual favorable solutions (Leather, 
2001:131;; Olmstead, 2014). Definitely, this manifests when water recurrently is situated within a 
militaristic/national security discourse.  
 
1.4 Motivation 
In the following, I will briefly explain my motivations for writing this thesis, emphasizing the theoretical 
refrain from traditional IR theories while stressing the importance of this particular study i.e. the saliency in 
explaining securitizing dynamics within a South-Asian hydro-political context. In addition, I will discuss the 
theoretical- and empirical motivations driving actors to pursue the accepted securitization of water itself.  
 
The Refrain from Traditional Theories  
In order to explain the increasing South-Asian hydrological securitization, Realism and Liberalism, the 
traditional theories of IR arguably prove deficient. Indeed, many scholars point to the explanatory short-
comings of both theories in a South-Asian context, as they fail to assign importance to the contextual 
identity- and socially constructed dynamics and mutual constitution of subjects and objects (Shafique, 
2011;; Pervez, 2013). Similarly, an emerging trend within hydro-politics views water not only as a physical 
commodity, but emphasizes its socially constructed character (Mustafa, 2007;; Stetter et al. 2011;; Burgess et 
al. 2013).  
In this thesis, I adopt the analytical framework of traditional Securitization Theory (ST) bolstered with 
recent theoretical elaborations, some which have been applied to an Asian setting. Thus, I align myself with 
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both strains of critiques: Those pointing out the analytical inadequacies of traditional IR theories (Checkel, 
1998: 324;; Pervez, 2013: 19, 72) and those arguing that hydrological analyses necessitate the inclusion of 
socio-political meanings and wider contexts (Stetter et al. 2011: 442;; Burgess et al. 2013: 2). In order to 
explain the??? ? ????? ??????????? ???????????? ??? ??????? ??????? ???? ??? ???????????? ????????? ??? ??????? ?????
(Wæver, 1995: 55;; Buzan et al. 1998: 36). Therefore, inspired by contemporary scholarship (Curley & 
Herrington, 2011;; Jones, 2011;; Balzacq, 2011) I argue for the s????????????????????????????????????????????????
well as speech acts. 
 
Importance of Research  
In theory, ??????????????????are eight times more likely to engage in military engagement, compared to states 
involved in isolated disputes (Misra, 2010: 10). Peacefully ending the Indo-Pakistani rivalry is evidently 
critical given its volatile nature, while factoring in the potential for nuclear escalation15. As explained, hydro-
politics are increasingly playing an important role in South-Asia, fueling conflicts while obstructing 
potential cooperation (Hazarika & Mehta, 2014: 20-23). I assume that the securitization of water 
contributes to the maintenance of antagonistic identities, which evidently is the agenda of certain 
securitizing actors (Pervez, 2013: 2, 45). Moreover, I contend that these actors recognize the instrumental 
????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????? ? ?????????????????????????????????????????
318) capable of politically integrate- or harmonize a society by collectively constructing an existential threat 
embodied by an enemy (Huysmans, 1998: 577). Relating this to hydro-political theory, Glecik (1993) 
indeed argues that water has rarely been the primary cause of conflict, but should be viewed as a 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
But is more security not a positive thing? Not according to the ????? ???????????????? ????????????? ????
often uncritically conceptualization of security as a preferred state, or ???universal good? (Buzan et al. 1998: 
4). This conceptualization is indeed problematic as security in Buzan et al??? ??????? ???? ?????? ???? ? 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
[thus] a secure relati??????? ?????? ????????? ???????? ??????????? ?1998: 4;; see also, Wæver, 1995: 212-213). 
Consequently, security should generally be understood as negative - a failure to politically manage conflicts, 
                                                                                                                    
15  The  nuclear  acquisition  of  both  countries  in  1998    have  been  crucial  for  the  persistence  of  the  conflict  (Misra,    2010:  16;  Chari,    2003:  23;  Khan,  2005:  
160;  Pardesi,  &  Ganguly,  2007:  131).  Moreover,  since  2000  the  South-­‐Asian  nuclear  arms-­‐race  has  only  become  more  intense  (Krepon  2015).    
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while the ???-??????????????????? ??????????????always be sought (Buzan et al. 1998: 29). De-securitization is 
the process of withdrawing ???????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
reduces the ???????? ??? ????????? ????????? ??? ????????????? ?Grayson, 2003: 341) and instead reintroduces 
??????????? ????? ?? ????????? ???????????? ?????? ?????? ???????????? ?????? ??? ???????? ???? ?????? ??? ???????????
(Emmers, 2013: 137). Theoretically, this process allows actors to refrain from the likely armed solutions to 
problems actually requiring various non-military responses (De Brito, 2012: 5-6).  
 
Pervez (2013) argues that the animosity and current security dilemma between India and Pakistan are 
created by the ruling classes of both countries, which have vested interests in maintaining this relationship 
(2013: 2, 44-45). ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????aser, 1997: 174). Perceptions 
are pivotal, as it is the very security initiatives undertaken by state A which is perceived as threatening to 
state B, thus leading the latter to react, consequently forcing similar reactions with the former (Pervez, 
2013: 2;; Glaser, 1997: 174). This self-reinforcing process has amply also bee?? ??????? ???? ????ral-???????
(Glaser, 1997: 171), a process undeniably in the interests of certain elements of the Indian and Pakistani 
elites alike to maintain (Bisht, 2011: 15-16;; Pervez, 2013: 44).  
 
In Pakistan, the security establishment has long dominated policymaking16, clearly obstructing attempts at 
peacemaking with India (Tadjabaksh, 2011: 20). In India, hawkish elements of the political elite, notably 
from the nationalistic Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) ????? ?? ??????? ? ?????? ??meaningful dialogue with 
Pa??????????bid. 20). As concrete examples, Pervez (2013) mentions the army in Pakistan (often the primary 
actor in state politics), which maintains power by projecting India as a threat (2013: 2;; Aqil, 2014: 256). In 
India, examples are drawn from Hindu fundamentalist parties (e.g. the BJP), which by adopting an anti-
Muslim/Pakistani discourse have experienced electoral success in 1996, 1997 and from 1998-2004 
respectively (Pervez, 2013: 2;; see also Kinnvall, 2002;; Kinnvall & Svensson 2010). 
 
                                                                                                                    
16   For  a  detailed  description  of   the  Pakistani   security  establishment,   consisting  of   top  military   commanders,   intelligence   community   leaders  and  elite  
bureaucrats,  see  Tadjabaksh,  2011:  21.    
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Why Actors Securitize 
By successfully securitizing an issue, actors gain acceptance for implementing extraordinary measures, e.g. 
increased secrecy, limiting former inviolable rights, or diverting resources towards a specific issue (Buzan et 
al. 1998: 24). Thus discursive threat-constructions become ??????????????????????????????????: 26) which 
invariably directs attention away from domestic (mis)management and related inequalities, and towards 
political projects intended to serve some groups more than others (Emmers, 2013: 136-137;; Wæver 1995: 
221). Moreover, while  further empowering the state by reducing democratic emancipation (Buzan et al. 
1998: 29;; Wæver, 2000: 2) enemy constructions are often (re)produced, thereby keeping civil society 
??????????????????? own fear?? ?????????????????????????????????????????? even more (in)security (Aradau, 
2001: 2). As Grayson (2003) explains, securitization is indeed a tempting strategy for policy makers, 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? simplistically shifting all 
blame/responsibility/guilt to another 
group/element/factor that is then seen 
??? ??????? ?????????? ????? must be 
??? ???????? ??????? ???? while they 
themselves gain additional power and 
authority.  
 
Hydrological securitization thus becomes 
instrumental in maintaining existing- or 
amassing greater political support 
(Emmers, 2013: 135-136). This is 
unquestionably taking place in South-
Asia (R. Singh, 2008: 8;; Sinha, 2014: 60) 
where one recent regional study found 
that politicians blaming domestic water woes on neighboring countries are common practice (Price et al. 
2014: 100;; see also Bisht, 2011: 15-16). While environmental securitizing can potentially infuse issues with 
much-needed urgency (Buzan et al. 1998: 23-25) there is a clear risk that the issue itself will ?????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(IDSA, 2010: 19;; see also Wæver, 1995: 22;; 2012, 53).  
 
Box 3: Public Opinions in India 
A pew poll, conducted prior to the Indian general election 
2014 found widespread popular dissatisfaction with the 
current state of the nation, especially concerning the 
declining economy, waning infrastructure and the level of 
state corruption, which all has led to a general delusion with 
the political establishment (Pewglobal, 2014a). Hence, the 
increasing securitization of water, the virtual explosion in 
hydrological infrastructure and the intensified usage of pro-
Hindu/anti-Muslim discourses could all be understood as 
attempts to divert attention away from these domestic issues.  
Poll 1: Opinion of Current State of the Country 
Don?t know: 
1% 
Dissatisfied: 
70% 
Satisfied: 
29% 
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In India and Pakistan, the abysmal condition of state institutions, rule of law, high corruption/low 
accountability (Barthwal-Datta, 2012: 3, 35-38;; Burki, 2012) leads to popular discontent with current 
policy-makers if not effectively diverted towards more perceived pressing issues (see Boxes 3 and 4 
respectively).  
 
Thus, I contend that similar dynamics 
are taking place in both countries, 
?????? ????????????? ????????? ????
unstable governments serv[e] as a 
backdrop to ethnic and religious 
?????????? ????????? ?Buzan, 2002: 7). 
Moreover, the security complex 
between the countries is equally about 
perceptions of one-another and about 
internal politico-military relations (Ibid. 
7). This manifests when certain issues 
are securitized ? with potential 
detrimental inter-state relational effects. 
Thus, my research agenda is to analyze 
the processes of Indo-Pakistani 
hydrological securitization, while 
shedding light on some of the underlying 
reasons motivating actors.  This is 
certainly a novel undertaking, as ST 
argues that political elites can 
simultaneously assert power- and gain 
additional political maneuverability 
through the successful securitization of 
issues (Emmers, 2013: 136). Moreover, 
as hydro-political theory contends, the 
Box 4: Public Opinions in Pakistan 
According to a 2013 Pew poll, 91% of respondents were 
dissatisfied with the current state of Pakistan while 81% thought 
the national economic conditions were bad (Pewglobal, 2013;; 
Pewglobal 2014b). As the following polls indicate, there is 
however a great confidence in the military establishment, while 
India is continuously seen as the biggest threat to the country. 
These sentiments fits with the findings of e.g. Bisht (2011), 
Tadjabaksh (2011) and Pervez (2013) which all argue that 
securitizing India works to divert attention away from domestic 
discontent while the military elites especially benefit from 
maintaining the threatening image of India.  
Poll 2: Influence on Pakistani State Affairs 
Good Bad 
Poll 3: Greatest Threat to Pakistan 
India 
Taliban 
al Qaeda 
Religious Leaders 
Media 
Military 
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mutual threat of water-scarcity could serve as a means for cooperation instead of conflict (IBWG, 2013: 
49-50;; Miner, et al. 2009: 207). Thus, it is of vital importance to further the understanding of hydro-political 
securitization between India and Pakistan in order to gain a better understanding of the obstructions to 
ending the enduring South-Asian rivalry.    
               
1.5 Ethical Considerations  
This study has been carried out in accordance with the ethical guidelines as formulated by the Swedish 
Research Council, entailing a range of ethical principles to be followed regarding data collection and 
interviews (Vetenskapsrådet, 2002). In terms of the latter, these requirements have not been relevant for 
my study as I refrain from conducting interviews myself. Nor do I undertake field studies, but solely limit 
myself to an investigation of discourses and practices, in which data is collected by conducting a holistic 
textual analysis of relevant empirical- and theoretical data. In regards to data collection, references are given 
whenever required, and quotes are either correctly cited or typographically represented whenever altered to 
fit the actual thesis text.  
 
1.6 Outline of Thesis  
The thesis is divided into three main parts;;  
The first section explains theories and concepts used, taking point of departure in a constructivist 
epistemology while presenting the various theoretical assumptions and concepts utilized, contextualized to 
the empirical focus. Moreover, I briefly explain ST while highlighting its various criticisms. An elaboration 
of the theory will then be synthesized into a bolstered analytical framework, derived primarily from the 
collective works of Buzan et al. (1998) John (2011), Balzacq (2011) and Curley and Herrington (2011).  
The second section entails the methodological considerations and choices. Here I emphasize the inherent 
choice of conducting a discourse analysis when utilizing ST, while elaborating on choice of data, 
limitations, and the chosen case study.  
The third section covers the actual analysis. Here I apply the theoretical framework to the Baglihar case-study, 
highlighting the political instrumental value of securitization. Subsequently, I will draw conclusions and 
discuss the prospective future for Indio-Pakistani hydro-diplomatic relations in a changing (political) 
climate, yet again emphasizing the imperative need for de-securitization.   
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2.  THEORIES AND CONCEPTS  
 
2.1 Social Constructivism in the Indo-Pakistani Context  
Constructivism is best understood in contrast to the two traditionally dominant theories of IR (neo)realism 
and (neo)liberalism. These theories emphasize material capabilities (Wendt, 1995: 71-72;; Checkel, 1998: 
326) while contending that state?? are primarily driven by ?structural power? and national interests (Adler, 
1997: 322;; Agius, 2013: 88;; Jackson & Sørensen, 2007: 60-61, 98-100). In contrast, constructivism views 
the interests of states as ???????????????structured by inter-???????????????????????????????????????????????-
Smit 2002: 488). Interaction is not merely influenced by material factors, but equally by ??????-su??????????
understandings, denoting the commonly shared ideas which produce both interests and identities of 
individuals, collectives and states (Chekel, 1998: 325-326;; Wendt, 1998: 71-72;; Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001: 
392-393;;). Moreover, ?????????????????????????????? ? ??????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????
agents (Agius, 2013: 95-96). According to Wendt (1998), the international state structure is not universally 
given, but continuously (re)shaped by the actions and practices of actors driven by identities and interest 
(1998: 71-72;; see also Reus-?????????????????????????????????? ???????????????? ????? ?????????????????????
shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction [which] depends on dynamic normative and epistemic 
interpretations of the ????????? ??????? ??????? ???? ?????????? ????????? Constructivists therefore do 
???????????? ???? ????????? ??? ?? ????????? ??????? ???? ?????? ????? ????????? ???? ??????????? ???? ?????????
constituted in ways that explain why the political world is s????????????????????? ??????????????????????
2001: 393). Conclusively, the constructivist critique of mainstream IR theories is based on them missing 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
Supported by research of e.g. Kinnvall & Svensson (2010), Bisht (2011), Tadjabaksh (2011) Pervez (2013) 
and Aqil (2014), I argue that the elite (re)produced Indo-Pakistani enmity has led to the current security 
dilemma. Constructivists define such dilemm?? ??? ??a social structure composed of intersubjective 
understandings in which states are so distrustful that they make worst-????????????????????????????????????
intentions, and as a result define their interests in self-????????????? ???????????????. Resembling Pervez 
???????? ?? ???????? ????? ????????? ??? ?????????? ????? ??? ???? ????????????? ??? ????? ??????? ????? ???? ??????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? thereby necessitating an inclusion of such 
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variables as identities, interests, discourses and inter-subjectivism - all key tenets of the constructivist 
paradigm (Chekel, 1998: 327-328;; Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001: 392-393;; Fierke, 2013: 187-202).  
 
Especially the notion of collective identities is highly relevant for this thesis. Encomp????????????????????????
??????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????dia and Pakistan respectively are enforcing the inherent 
enmity and fear of one another (Pervez, 2013: 24-25;; Nasr, 2005: 178-179). Indeed as Pervez (2013) 
explains, these two c???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(2013: 34). As mentioned, studies have found that nationalism, religion and utilizing the perceived threat 
???????????????????ve all been instrumental for Hindu fundamentalist elites to attract individual identities by 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-95;; Kinnvall & Svensson, 2010: 
282-283), just as certain Pakistani elites exploit the exaggerated image of India as a national threat (Bisht, 
2011: 5-6;; Tadjabaksh, 2011: 21-22).  Therefore, there is arguably a clear connection between identities and 
interests, or as Wendt (1998) him????? ????????? ??????????? ?????????? ??????????? ????? ???????????????? ???????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
Conclusively, the Indo-Pakistani rivalry can ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
expectatio???? ?????? ???? ???????? ?????????? ????? ???? oppositional identities constructed by elites with 
interests in maintaining the animosity. By refraining from (neo)realist/liberalist explanations of the conflict, 
the constructivist approach enables me to unveil the deeper sociological/identity-related elements. Indeed, 
Buzan et al. (1998) note that the Indio-Pakistani conflict cannot be explained solemnly in structural terms, 
????????????????????????????????????????????? which politics and identity [are] linked in t??????????????????
(1998: 133). The previous research mentioned all support this contention (e.g. Kinnvall, 2002;; Kinnval & 
Svensson, 2010;; Bisht, 2011;; Sinha et al. 2012;; Pervez, 2013;; Khalid et al. 2014;; Price et al. 2014;; Aquil, 
2014).  Behnke (2006) ade???????????????????????????????????????????????????????nclusion and community 
can only be had at the price of exclusion and adversity? (2006: 65).  
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Box 5: Broadening and Deepening Security 
Following the inability of traditional IR theories to 
explain the abrupt end of the Cold War (Buzan et al. 
1998: 2-3;; Jackson & Sørensen, 2007: 162-163), the core 
concept of security is now generally accepted to be both 
???????????? and ???????????? ???????? ?????????????? ????
wide range of new threats in contrast to solely 
emphasizing state/military actions (Collins, 2013: 2;; 
Jones, 2011: 404). Security analyses now include multiple 
issues, e.g. poverty, poor governance, trans-national 
crime, piracy, climate change and resource scarcity 
(Dalby, 1997: 3;; Barthwal-Datta, 2012: 4). Moreover, 
beside the traditional focus on state-survival, various 
?????? ???????????? ??? ??? ????????????? ????? ?????????? ?????
the economy, society and the environment (Buzan et al. 
1998: 7-8;; Mutimer, 2007: 60-61;; Emmers, 2013: 110;; 
Collins, 2013: 6-7).  
2.2 Copenhagen School and Securitization Theory 
Hydro-politics is increasingly being situated in the language of security, which once invoked, can have 
detrimental societal effects (Turton, 2003: 75;; Wæver, 1995: 213).  Acknowledging this assumption, I argue 
for the saliency in Securitization Theory as an analytical framework for investigating the political aspects of 
South-Asian hydro-politics. Following the Cold-War a wide range of new conceptualizations of- and 
theoretical approaches to security emerged simultaneously. In refraining from traditional (neo)realist or 
liberal understandings, they all argued for a 
simultaneous ??????????????????????????????????? 
conceptual apparatus (see Box 5). Among these 
theories, especially the ??????????? ?????????
(CS) Securitization Theory gained huge scholarly 
attention, and has been applied to a wide range 
of empirical studies (Aradau, 2004: 388-389;; 
Emmers, 2007: 110-111;; Jones, 2011: 404).   
 
As explained, constructivists contend that 
objects are not universally given, but instead 
infused with characteristics and meaning through 
intersubjective interaction. ST adopts this 
assumption, thereby viewing security-problems as discursively constructed by framing certain issues as 
existential threatening to a specific referent object (Buzan et al 1998;; 25-26). Wæver (1995), one of the ?????
founders, explains that security can be understood as a speech act, not referring to anything more ?real??
(1995: 55). Theoretically, by articulating security, ????????frame?? ???????????????????????????????????????????
implementations of extraordinary measures to secure survival are potentially legitimized (Buzan et al. 1998: 
26;; Munster, 2004: 6). As mentioned, everything can in theory be constructed as a security issue by the 
securitizing speech act, which if successful, moves an issue ???????????????????????????????????????????Emmers, 
2013: 134;; see also Figure 1).  
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                                    Figure 1: Spectrum of Securitization  
 
The Securitizing Move  
The process presented in Figure 1 is primarily determined by the ?securitizing actor? and ?referent object(s)?. 
Buzan et al. (1998) define the former as a?? ???????? ???? ??????????s issues by declaring something, a 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????vulnerable element, framed 
by the securitizing actor as endangered by the threat (Ibid. 40;; Emmers, 2013: 134-135). Moreover, 
audience acceptance is pivotal for successful securitization as orders equally rests on popular coercion and 
consent. Therefore securitizings move can never be crudely imposed, but needs to be argued for (Buzan et 
al. 1998: 25). ST formulates a number of facilitating conditions for successful securitization, divided into the 
internal, or linguistic/grammatical dimension17, and the external, contextual and social counterpart (Ibid. 
31-33;; Wæver, 2000: 9;; Emmers, 2013: 134-135). Within the internal dimension, the securitizing actor must 
??????? ??? ???? ????????? ??? ??????????? ???? ????????? ??? ?????????? ?? ??????? ????? ????????? ???????????? ????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????et al. 1998: 33). In the latter dimension, the position of 
the speech actor is emphasized, s???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??
the possibility for successful securitization will vary dramatically with the position held by the actor (Ibid. 
31). As such, ST includes the social capital of the securitizing actor, denoting the level of authority 
perceived by the audience addressed (Ibid. 33). In addition, the embedded characteristics of the threat 
influence securitizing moves, as potential threats will be easier accepted if they are ???????ally held to be 
threatening ? be they tanks, hostile sentiments o??????????????????????????????? 
 
                                                                                                                    
17  ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-­‐theoretical  sense  (Buzan  et  al.  1998:  32).      
Non-Politicized 
The state refrains 
from dealing with 
the issue.  
 
The issue is not 
part of public 
concern or debate. 
Politicized 
The issue is handled 
within the traditional 
political system. It 
remains within the 
sphere of public 
policy, thereby 
requiring decisions 
and resource 
allocations. 
Securitized 
The issue is 
transformed into a 
question of 
security. If accepted 
as such, the issue is 
dealt with outside 
the boundaries of 
?????????????????? 
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Sectors and Security Complexes  
By broadening and widening security multiple new levels open up for analysis. Correspondingly, if post-
Cold War security-analyses are to be fruitful, researchers must refrain from viewing the state as the only 
referent object (Buzan et al. 1998: 7-8). Therefore, ST formulates the concept of sectors - characterized by 
the particular security relationships inherent (Buzan & Wæver, 2003:  Herring, 2013: 46-47). Figure 2 
displays the various sectors, relationships and typical threats.  
 
 
 
Hydro-political disputes will logically often be situated within or deriving from the environmental sector. 
Buzan et al. (1998) note that especially this sector is complicated because of the many issues spilling into 
various other sectors, e.g. migration problems produced by water-scarcity affecting the societal sector, or 
war-related environmental damage and violence spilling into the military or political sector (1998: 74-75, 
89;; Turton, A. 2003: 116;; Barnett, 2013: 191, 194). Importantly, the referent objects of the environmental 
sector are traditionally easily identifiable and greatly valued by the public, thus linking security to everyday 
life/public awareness plays a significant role in the successful transformation of issues (Aradau, 2004: 400).   
 
Finally, Buzan et al. (1998) ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????hich to 
apply the theory (1998: 201;; Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 43-44). The SC, similar to the security dilemma, 
Figure 2: Sectors in Securitization Theory 
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Box 6: Epistemological Consideration 
In conducting a securitization analysis, I 
invariably assume that actors and structure are 
mutually constitutive (Buzan et al. 1998: 3031, 
204-205;; Agius, 2013: 88;; Emmers, 2013: 135). 
???????????????????????????-subjectivism??????s 
?? ?????? ?????? ????????? ????? ??identities, 
interests and behavior of political agents are 
socially constructed by collective meaning, 
interpretations and assumptions about the 
world?????????????????????? 
By taking point of departure in the 
epistemological assumptions inherent in  
constructivism, I adopt an interpretative 
approach to the discursive- and material 
aspects of the analysis, in which I attempt to 
understand the process of constructing inter-
subjective meaning through discursive acts.  
  
involves states which perceive every action by one another as a direct threat to their own security18. Or in 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
securitization, desecuritization or both, are so interlinked 
that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed 
??? ????????? ?????? ????? ????? ??????? ??????? ????? ???? ?????
Buzan & Wæver 2003: 44-45).  
 
Since threats are linked to geographical proximity (Buzan et 
al. 1998: 57) Buzan & Wæver (2003) argue that ?[s]imple 
physical adjacency tends to generate more security 
interaction among neighbors than among states located in 
?????????????????????????????consequentially leading states to 
often perceive neighbors in a security complex as more 
threatening than rivalries located far away. As such, 
conceptual regional attention is added, thereby shifting 
analysis from the global level to a limited geographical area in which ??the extremes of national and 
global security interplay, and where most of the action occurs?? ??????? ????? Certainly, the concept of 
?????????? ????????? ?omplexes?? ????? is beneficial in identifying dynamics between riparian neighbors, 
especially increasing securitization produced  by pending basin closure (Turton, 2003: 76).   
 
Critiques and Elaborations                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
While ST has been extensively applied, and is readily adopted in this thesis, it is not without analytical 
shortfalls: Key critiques involve the heavy emphasis on speech acts while ignoring other forms of 
expression (Hansen, 2000;; Bigo, 2002;; Balzacq, 2005), inherent Eurocentrism (Jones, 2011) and the 
simplistic conceptualization of audiences (Curley & Herrington, 2011;; Miumachi, 2013). Moreover, meta-
theoretical criticism based on ????????????? ???????????? ??? ?????????????? ????????? ??????? themselves have 
been formulated (e.g. Huysmans, 1998: 126). While agreeing with the above criticisms, a detailed discussion 
is not the aim of this thesis. Thus, I will mainly elaborate on research by Jones (2011), Balzacq (2011) and 
                                                                                                                    
18  For  an  account  of  the  traditional  defensive  realist  understanding  of  the  security  dilemma,  see  Glaser,  2013:  16.    
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Box 7: Case-Example, India 
Despite all evidence of the pending threat, the 
issue of depleting ground-water in India is still 
not politically securitized (Upadhaya, 2014: 36). 
Environmental securitization primarily revolves 
nternational river disputes which must be seen 
?????????????????????????????????????????ment 
of ground-?????? ?????????????????????? ????????
of good governance and widespread 
????????????? ??????? ????? ?????????? ????
abysmal state of urban infrastructures, 
combined with intense population growth have 
placed severe impediments on water 
quantity/quality, waste management etc. but the 
issue is generally ignored at both federal and 
state level as necessary reforms would likely be 
politically unpopular (Miklian & Kolås, 2014: 3) 
Arguably, hydrological securitization is 
attempted to divert attention way from the 
above mentioned problems. 
Box 8: Case-Example, Pakistan 
A recent study found that in Pakistan, flammable discourses 
and linkages of water-scarcity to India severely increased 
during Winter when water availability was significant lower, 
?????? ???? ???????ivity towards India reduce[d] in the 
Summer months (Alam et al. 2011: 67-68). While noting 
various reasons for this disparity, the study nevertheless 
emphasized the instrumental value of securitization 
(specifically in scapegoating India), contending it would be 
???????? ??? ??????? ????? ?????????? ???????????? ? ?? ???? ???
attempt to deflect attention from poor governance and 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
Curley and Herrington (2011) ???????????????????? ?????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????
analysis. Moreover, adopting their analytical foci necessitate an elaboration on Practice Theory (PT) itself.  
 
While traditional ST describes how something becomes 
???????????????????????????explain why one issue is selected 
over another or why it is governed (or not) in a particular 
????? ???????? ?????? ??? [emphases added]). Thus, ST can 
merely be characterized as a ??problem-???????? ????????
(Barthwal-Datta, 2012: 4) which by both ???????????? given 
???????? ???? ? ??????? ?? ??? to fix particular problems, 
actually invariably reproduces present structures (Mutimer, 
2013: 63). In contrast, some scholars refrain from 
?????????? ???? ????????????? ??????? ???? ??????????
??????????????? ??????????? ??? ?????? ??????????? ???? ????????
(Barthwal-Datta, 2012: 12), but instead investigate how 
these structures initially came to be, thereby revealing the 
interests of actors within (Cox, 1981: 128-129). This 
requires ????????????? ????????? ????????? ??? ?????????
domestic interests [while] considering how social, economic, and political forces constrain or enable 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
Similarly, Balzack (2011) contends that 
securitization is better conceptualized as an 
instrumental or ?????????? ???????? ???????
occurs within, and as part of, a configuration 
of circumstances, i????????? ???? ??????? ??
(2011: 2;; see also Gad & Petersen, 2011: 
318). Or as Jones (2011) explains, research 
should emphasize?? ??how securitization 
advances particular agendas by suspending 
??????????????????????????????????????????? 
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In Asia, the state is not necessarily a unitary actor, but policies can instead be influenced by several 
??wider contestations over state-building and other internal power struggles between competing social 
??????? ???? ???????? ?Curley & Herrington 2011: 146). Hence, by only applying a fixed state-centric 
???????????????????????????is unable to account for why some issues are securitized over others because it 
????????? ?????????? ????????????? ???? ???? ??????? ???? ????????? ????????? ??? ??????? ??????????? ???????? ??????
407).  The empirical examples presented in Boxes 7 and 8 on the preceding page support my contention 
that Indian and Pakistani elites alike partly practice securitization due ??? ?????? ???????? ??????????? ???
maintaining the security dilemma.  
 
As explained elsewhere, a brief elaboration on my adoption of Practice Theory is in order as well. This field 
is indeed quite expansive, entailing multiple theoretical assumptions, approaches and foci, thus it is 
impossible to formulate one coherent or unified theory, but ???????a body of highly divisive writings by 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Hence, while the theory can be 
applied from ??????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????? ??? ??????????????
?????????? ?Rouse, 2007: 499), I ?? ?????????? ??????????? ???????????????????????????? ?? ? ???????? ???????? by 
explaining its relevancy in a South-Asian context. This is achieved by employing the ?event-analytical? 
approach, inspired by the research of particularly Commuri (2009).   
 
A key debate within PT has regarded the restraints on the individual agency by larger social structures 
(Postill, 2010: 5). Wholists argue that individual actions indeed rely upon social and cultural contexts, 
therefore one simply cannot understand such practices as e.g. voting, exchanging money or implementing 
security-measures ???????? ???eference to supra-??????????? ?????????? ???????? ?????? ?????? ?????????
recalling the constructivist concept of mutual social constitution, I stress the appropriateness of what 
Ortner (1984) then characterized as modern versions of PT, which all argue ??????????????? ?????????????
that the system is powerfully constraining, and yet that the system can be made and unmade through 
hu???? ??????? ???? ????????????? ????4: 159). Moreover, by assuming that social practices are driven by 
identity, I argue for the relevancy in combining discourse analysis with an investigation of events ? 
interpreted ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????because although discourses shed light 
on the dynamics driving practices, the actual events allow researchers to assess these practices and connect 
the two. Indeed, Commuri (2009) adequately utilizes this method when investigating the role of Indo-
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Pakistani national narratives in shaping foreign policy vis-à-vis one another. Hence I contend that 
??juxtaposing discourses (expressions of national identity) and events (observable ???????? ??? ?????????
(Commuri, 2009: 162) enables me to understand how ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
influence decision-making on the individual level. In other words, in this thesis, practices are understood as 
individual- or collective actions (re)producing hydro-securitization, all motivated by the political gains to be 
reaped from the outcome. By pra???????? ??????????? ?????????????? ???????? states systematically favoring the 
interests of the dominant forces, existing structures of power and dominance are revealed. And unveiling 
these structures ????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????nship to the strategies and interests 
???? ??????????????????????????????????????????-425).  
 
Thus, traditional ST is arguably flawed by ignoring motivations behind securitization. Moreover, the state-
centric approach miss Non-State Actors? (NSAs) influence on policy-makers - especially in an Asian 
context. As mentioned, there the political apparatus is often not a unitary actor (Curley & Herrington 2011: 
146), but is instead influenced by various social forces which ?????????????????? ???interests, ideologies, 
???????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????
responses (Jones, 2011: 425). By only looking at state-led security-responses, traditional ST undeniably miss 
?????? ? ??????????????????????ecuritization, something which many scholars argue are pivotal in raising 
security concerns (Jones, 2011: 405, 409;; Curley & Herington 2011: 145-146;; Barthwal-Datta, 2012:  5). For 
instance, t???????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????onalized competences constructing 
reality within a particular defined context, indeed deserve attention (Evers & Gerke, 2005: 3;; Gooch & 
Stålnacke, 2010: 4). While claiming to provide objective information, they are in fact themselves far from 
value free, as their opinions and agendas are produced within a world of paradigms19 (Ibid. 4). Hence, I 
argue for the relevancy of including such actors in the subsequent analysis.  
 
While elaborating on various criticisms, I still contend that ST is an adequate theoretical departure as the 
theory emphasizes ?top leaders?, ?states?, ?threatened elites?? and ?audiences?? with agenda making power 
(Booth, 2007: 164-166). This analytical scope is indeed fitting since I hypothesize that elite actors with 
significant discursive power are (re)producing the antagonistic relationship between India and Pakistan.  
                                                                                                                    
19  For  instance,  there  is  evidence  that  water  research  focusing  on  conflict  may  be  more  easily  published  (Katz,  2012:  12).  
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Box 9: Merging Constructivism and 
(neo)Realism 
Securitization Theory blends 
(neo)realist notions of material threats 
with the constructivist understanding of 
mutual constitution (Jones, 2011: 408). 
According to Buzan et al. (1998), 
????????? ??????? ???? ?????????????? ???
the intersubjective establishment of an 
???????????? ???????? ?????? 25) thus 
denoting the assumption that 
??????????????? ??????? ??? ???????????
constructed [and] part of a discursive, 
socially constituted intersubjective 
???? ?? ??????? ???? ??? ?????? ??????????
??????? ???????? ???????? ???? ??????
action through the structure of shared 
knowledge in which they are 
embedded???Wendt, 1998: 73).  
  
Indeed, Barhwal-Datta (2012) contends that ST ????? ????-suited to the pursuits of those who wish to 
understand how state-led security policy is negotiated by state elites? (2012: 8 [emphasis added]).  
 
Therefore, while the meaning of security can be contested among 
various social groups consequently reflecting competing interests 
of power (Jones, 2011: 410), I still contend that focusing on elite 
?????????????????????while including security practices as evidence of 
securitization, is one analytical adequate approach. Moreover, the 
hydrological foci only makes the subsequent securitization analysis 
more relevant. Certainly, the convergence of material objects and 
constructed meanings inherent in ST (see Box 9) are suitable for 
understanding Indo-Pakistani hydrological-relations - relations in 
which a recent PRIO paper found that ???????? ??? ??????? ??????
seem to shape the securitization agenda for rivers in the region [by] 
connections between objective notions of scarcity, absolute leaps in 
population numbers and perceived geo-strategic requirements???????????????
11 [emphasis added]).  
 
2.3 The Hydrological Security Complex   
??? ???? ???????? ????????? ???? ???????? ??? ?? ? ???????????? ????????? ????????? ?????? ????? ??? ?????????? By 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????-hegemonic practices and lower-riparian complexes, 
this part explains how India and Pakistan respectively are situated, thereby influencing processes of 
securitization in markedly diverse ways.   
 
Unquestionably, the linkages between water, food, and energy have become a key component in South-
Asian security relations (IDSA 2010: 20), relations which can be analyzed as a HSC, thereby enabling 
multiple levels of inquiry on riparian state dynamics (Turton, 2003: 85;; Sinha, 2014: 60). This particular 
complex manifests when two or more states in a traditional SC are both ????????? ???? ???????? ??? ???????
rivers, while beginning to perceive these rivers as a critical national security concern (Schulz, 1995: 97). 
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Certainly, HSCs are analytically appropriate for the subsequent analysis. For instance, Buzan et al.  (1998) 
themselves argue the presence of environmentally related SCs, noting for instance Indo-Pakistani 
hydrological-?????????? ??? ?????? ??????????? ???????????????? ????????? ???? ?????? ??? ?????? ???????? ??????
flow, salinization, and hydroelectricity (1998: 88).  
 
Hydro-Hegemony and Lower-Riparian Anxiety 
To further explain the South-Asian HSC, the hydro-hegemonic position of India and lower-riparian 
Pakistan will be briefly addressed: A hydro-???????? ??? ???? ???????????? ?????? ??? ??? ????????????? ?????????
relationship, which through its superior position utilizes a wide range of coercive strategies in order to 
create a situation of unequal distribution and control of shared resources (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006: 437-
438, 446-450). Motivated by the hydraulic mission, denoting the manifestation of a given hydrological 
approach/ideology, the hydro-hegemon ordinarily seeks to mobilize water and improve the security of 
supply (Turton, 2003: 1, 71).  
 
The low-order riparian is close to the estuary of the River - a vulnerable position as both quality- and 
quantity of water are determined by the upstream riparian, over which the former often has no control, 
thereby fixating the lower-riparian in a situation of permanent fear (Turton, 2003: 13;; Hazarika & Mehta, 
2014: 24-25). Undeniably, Pakistani officials perceive Indian constructions of dams as giving the latter ????
measure of contr?????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-607) as it 
?????????????????????????????????20 (Ibid. 9;; see also Bisht, 2011: 5-6). As previously argued, this anxiety or 
????????????? ?????? ??????????013: 25) is indeed constr?????? ????? ???????????? ??? ?????????????? ??????????????
???????????????, 2013: 9;; see also Buzan et al. 1998: 26;; Sinha, et al. 2012: 742). One recurring example is 
linking domestic water-scarcity to India, thereby deflecting popular dissatisfaction (Bisht, 2011;; R. Singh, 
?????????? ?????? ??? ??????? ?????????? ????????? ?????????? ??being outpaced by poorer countries on many 
indicators of human ????????????? ?Miklian & Kolås 2014: 1) similar motivations for the South-Asian 
??????????????can be assumed.  
 
                                                                                                                    
20  This  could  be  deprivation  of  water  or  instigate  a  regional  flooding  (IDSA,  2010:  37).      
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Thus, current Indo-Pakistani hydrological-dynamics can be understood as a mutual process of 
securitization, partly influenced by their respective positions in the HSC?? ??? ??????? ??????? ??????? ?? 
securitization moves are linked to the broader patterns of amity and enmity that exist between the riparian 
states, so each international river basin is somewhat unique and specific (Turton, A. 2003: 95;; [emphasis added]). 
This is no less true for the South-Asian HSC, in which notions of the Hindu/Muslim divide and the 
Kashmir-dispute directly spill into the highly militarized water-discourse, consequently enforcing dynamics 
in which every move by one actor invariably is perceived as threatening by the other.nTable 1 synthesizes 
the theoretical section into one analytical framework:  
 
 
 
              Table 1: Analytical Framework  
  
  
   26  
2.4 Methodology  
Any sound IR analysis necessitates a sound methodology and ????????????????? ??????????? ??? ?????????
?????? ??? ????? ?????????? ????????????????, 2004: 1). Applying discourse analysis ? an integral part of any 
securitization analysis - is one way of achieving this. In the following section I ???????? ???? ??????? 
methodological choices, emphasizing the application of discourse analysis and the various 
methodological/theoretical considerations inherent.   
Applying Discourse Analysis  
Buzan et al. ??????? ???????? ????? ????he way to study securitization is to study discourse and political 
constellations?? ??????? ??). As explained, securitization is constituted by the very speech act hence 
securitization analysis can be understood as a particular type of discourse analysis (Ibid. 26-27, 177-179). 
Discourses are certain representations of the social world which involve practices such as speech, writings, 
images and gestures, all utilized by social actors to produce and interpret meaning (Torfing, 2005: 7;; 
Fairclough, 2007: 26-28;; Potter, 2004: 202). Discourses shape perceptions, which thereby construct a 
???????? ?????????? ??????????? ?? ????????? ?????? ????? ??????? ?? ??????????? ?????? ?-5). Indeed, Buzan et al. 
(1998) themselves argue for the saliency of this approach if ???? ??????????? ????????????? ?????????? ????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????
shared history and metaphorical usages, discourse analysis is particular effective when including the socio-
political and historical context (Hajer 2005: 300) - something I consequently do.  
 
Discourses can be an intangible concept to grasp. It has been characterized as a specific analytical method, 
a methodology in itself and a particular (meta)theoretical and analytical understanding of social life (Wertz 
et al. 2011: 4, 205). Moreover, the wide range of different discourse analyses entaili various epistemological 
and ontological assumptions, which consequently make it a ?non-specific term? (Wood & Kroger, 2000: 
18). Hence, as both method and theory, discourse analysis can be confounding. Fortunately, as the 
securitizing argument itself is ?powerful?, it is often visibly deployed in the discourses surrounding the issue 
investigated (Buzan et al. 1998: 177). Since it is against the very logic of the securitizing move to stay 
???????? ???? ??????????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??? ???????? ????????????? ?????? ????????? ???? ??????? ???
????????????? ? ????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
177). As such, with the above theoretical assumptions in mind, I will utilize discourse analysis as a method 
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to reveal securitizing moves by relevant actors, focusing on key debates revolving the disputed areas 
investigated.   
 
Data  
Studying speeches, statements and comments regarding my case-study is required for the following 
analysis. Moreover, as the theoretical framework is expanded by emphasizing security practices, I also 
include a wide range of empirical research on Indo-Pakistani hydrological disputes. Consequently, data will 
be drawn from second-hand sources, such as academic books and journals, surveys and reports from 
think-tanks and organizations as well as official governmental documents. I also include popular media 
(newspapers and online magazines) as these have been instrumental for elites in constructing specific self-
serving perceptions by communicating with civilian society and stakeholders alike (Alam et al. 2011: 48).   
Thus, the main type of sources used ????????????????????? ??????? ????????? ???????????????? ? one of six 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Table 2 displays the various 
sources and their purpose.  
 
 
 
Empirical Delimitations 
Due to certain limitations, it is futile to attempt an extensive analysis concerning overall Indo-Pakistani 
hydrological securitization and the ??????????? ????????? ???????. Therefore, I delimit myself to one single 
case-study - the conflict regarding the Indian Baglihar hydro-electric project. The dispute intensified 
                   Table 2: Data Used in Study 
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around the new millennium and was formally concluded in 2008. As such, a fairly chronologic analysis 
which covers approximately a decade of hydrological conflict is undertaken.   
 
Applying Case Studies  
Case study research is the investigation of an issue examined through one or multiple cases, within a 
limited setting or context (Creswell 2007: 73). In seeking to identify- and explain securitizing moves, the 
choice of conducting a limited case study is indeed sound, as this method is highly adept in identifying and 
assessing the indicators most adequate representing the theoretical concept the researcher intends to 
measure (Bennet, 2004: 34). Moreover, this approach entails a number of advantages for the interpretive 
researcher, such as the contextualization and operationalization of qualitative variables, and, with the 
support of sound theory, the identification of causality in highly complex relations (Kacowicz, 2004: 108).  
 
Choice of Case ? Why the Baglihar Issue  
The choice investigating the Baglihar case is based on four assumptions, all made following a close 
investigation of literature regarding contemporary Indo-Pakistani hydrological disputes, which aggregated 
justify the saliency in the chosen case;;   
First, As the Baglihar case was referred to international arbitration, it entails at least elements of securitizing 
dynamics, thus evidently marking the ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? et al. 1998: 
29). Second, the dispute involved a significant higher level of tension compared to previous Indo-Pakistani 
hydro-political conflicts, thereby standing out as the most divisive hydro-electric project, consequently 
severely impacting future hydrological relations (Bisht, 2011: 3). Third????????????? ??????????? hydrological 
securitization began simultaneou???? ????? ???? ?????? ???????? ??? ???? ?????????? ???????? ????????? ??? ????????
(Alam et al. 2011: 23). Thus, a causal relationship between water-scarcity, increasing overall hydrological 
securitization, and the particular intensity of the Baglihar-dispute can be assumed Fourth, as Baglihar is 
located in the disputed Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), additional dynamics fueled by 
nationalism and irredentist claims seep into the political discourses (Saideman, 2005: 202-203;; Bisht, 2011: 
5) Indeed, the Bagli???????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
geostrategic concerns vis-à-vis ?????????? ?Price et al. 2014. 67). Moreover, many scholars highlight the 
???????????????????????????territorial claim on the region and its vital need for securing water- while fearing 
Indian control of the Indus (Burgess et al. 2013: 15;; R. Singh, 2008). 
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3.  ANALYSIS: SECURITIZATION ON THE INDUS RIVER                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
In this section, I analyze securitizing dynamics within the Baglihar dispute. The analysis is two-fold, 
simultaneously investigating securitizing discourses and practices by India and Pakistan, while also 
explaining the underlying motives driving these dynamics within the South-Asian HSC.  Accordingly, much 
attention to the individual positions of hydro-hegemonic India and lower-riparian Pakistan will be given. 
The analytical saliency of this approach has been argued for in the prior section.  
 
3.1. Introduction 
Unquestionably, the decade long Baglihar dispute became a turning point in Indo-Pakistani hydrological 
relations (Bisht, 2011;; Alam et al. 2011;; Price et al. 2014). Constructions were initiated in 1999 and the dam 
stood complete in 2008 - following years of constant accusations and counter-claims, partly driven by the 
effects of increasing securitization and the related ulterior political motives (R. Singh, 2008: 8;; Sinha, 2010: 
483). Though the inclusion of a neutral arbiter led to an official settlement in 2008, this only produced 
further Pakistani frustration and overall dissatisfaction with the IWT, thereby paving the way for the 
increased securitization of future hydrological conflicts (Hill, 2013: 253;; Wirsing & Jasparro, 2006: 2). Map 
4 displays the location of Baglihar Dam, set within the disputed region of J&K. 
 
  
                                                                                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 4: Baglihar Dam 
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Water-security has indeed long been on the Indian national agenda (Alam et al. 2011: 5): At the 2004 
Independence Day, Prime Minister (PM) Singh told a massive crowd that ???]e need to ensure the 
equitable use of scarce ????????????????????????????????????????????????). Moreover, he also linked water 
to national security: ?????????????national ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????? ???????????? (Sinha, 2005: 319 [emphasis added]). This view was reiterated three years later when 
Singh ????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??(Singh, 2007). In addition, the PM stressed 
the dangers of climate change, highlighting the importance of India accommodating to the dire 
environmental outlook (Hindustan Times, 2007a). Previously, the official 2002 National Water Policy 
(NWP) had already framed water as a national concern, referring to water as ??????? ??????????????????????
basic human need and a precious national ??????? ?????? ?????? ? [emphasis added]). A decade later, the 
subsequent NWP (2012) stressed the urgency and importance of the water-issue?????scarce natural resource, 
water is fundamental to life, livelihood, food security and sustainabl?? ????????????? ??????? ???????????
added]).  
 
The ???????????? ?????????? ??? ???????? in the above securitizing moves as water is presented as a ?????????
resource. Thereby it is infused with priority and urgency, thus requiring extraordinary measures to be dealt 
with (Buzan et al. 1998: 26;; Munster, 2004: 6). Equally important, ?????????????????????????????????????frames 
its preservation as a matter concerning all Indian, while explicitly situating responsibility within the state-
apparatus. Moreover, it consolidates audiences ???????????????????????????????????????????????all the while 
???????????? ?????????? ????? ????? ?????? ???? ?????? ????????????? (Kinnvall & Svensson, 2010: 277). 
?????????????? ?facilitating conditions? of securitization are indeed strengthened through inter-subjective 
audience acceptance (Huysmans, 1998: 577). Finally, as securitization are attempted by actors with 
considerable social capital, the likelihood of audience acceptance arguably increases (Buzan et al. 1998: 31, 
33).  
 
Likewise elite-level securitizing moves can be observed in Pakistan, most notably by former President 
Zardari who in a 2009 ??????????? ????? ???????? ?????? ????? ?????? ??????? ??? ????????? ??? ????????? ??????? ???
relations with India. Resolution could prevent an environmental catastrophe in South-Asia, but failure to 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
As mentioned, Pakistani elites have a long practice of linking domestic environmental problems to security 
issues with India (Bisht, 2011;; Tadjabaksh, 2011;; Aqil, 2014) - especially by connecting water-scarcity to the 
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increase of Indian hydro-power projects (Alam et al. 2011: 5). In Pakistan, the consumption of water is 
heavily directed towards agriculture, which as of 2008 stood for 94% of the total water withdrawal and 
contributed to ??????? ???? ?????????????? ??bid: 3;; Khalid, 2014: 263). According to Bakshi & Trivedi 
(2011) this trend is unlikely to change, as the sector employs approximately ???? ??? ???? ??????????
population, while providing for 60-70% of its exports (2011: 6). Therefore, water for Pakistan is undeniably 
a matter of life and death ? a fact repeatedly mentioned while linking its increasing scarcity to Indian hydro-
practices. Indeed, this is a common trait within the environmental sector, in which aggregate perceptions of 
dangers often ?distort? the distinctions between natural and human threats, thereby making environmental 
security a matter with tangible, or human, ?????????????????et al. 1998: 81).  Furthermore, the securitizing 
language constructs notions of belonging ??? ???? ???-??????? ?????? ????????????????? ???? ????-??????????? ???
understood as existentially threatening to the existing social order (Aradau, 2004: 396;; Kinnvall & 
Svensson, 2010: 276-277). Similarly, the language of security entails considerable integrative power by 
creating political cohesiveness through the construction of existential threats (Huysmans, 2002: 44). In 
framing water as a national concern, arguably PM Singh attempted to create such notions of belonging by 
??????????? ???????????????? ??????????????? ????????????????????? ????? ???????? ???????????????? ???? ?????????????
????????? ??? ???????????????? President ????????? securitizing move likewise adequately fits into Huysmans? 
account of the internal political cohesiveness produced by constructing external threats.  
 
Unquestionably, the South-Asian enmity has seeped into water policies as ?????????????-hegemonic, actions 
toward Pakistan have ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????? ? ????????????????????????????
(Price, et al. 2014: 68). Often linked to matters of national security, these actions are partly responsible for 
the increasing securitization of the water discourse (IDSA 2010: 20). Moreover, this produces additional 
animosity and anxiety in Pakistan, highlighting the dynamics of the HSC, consequently impeding potential 
for hydro-political cooperation (Price et al. 2014: 67, 70).  
 
In other words, water is constructed as an existential threat, therefore requiring action beyond the level of 
normal politics (Wæver, 1995: 221). This consequentially gives a political momentum, essential for the 
implementation of extraordinary measures (Buzan et al. 1998: 25;; Emmers, 2013: 135-136). Certainly this 
?????????????????????????? ?? taking place in South-Asia, which must be viewed in the wider context of the 
?????????? ????????? ? a relationship some political actors have clear motivations in maintaining, thereby 
??????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????? 
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Table 3 summarizes the overall hydro-securitization between India and Pakistan:  
 
 
 
3.2. The Initial Stage ? Hydro-Hegemony and Lower-Riparian Fears   
The intensified South-Asian environmental securitization unquestionably fostered a climate of zero-sum 
perceptions (Olmstead, 2014;; Price et al. 2014: 67). This is clearly visible in the Baglihar dispute, the first 
Indo-Pakistani hydrological conflict not solved through bilateral negotiations (Sinha et al. 2012: 744;; 
Briscoe, 2013). Moreover, I contend Baglihar displays the dynamics of the HSC, as the efforts to improve 
(water)security by India unquestionably increased Pakistani perceptions of insecurity. Consequently, this 
placed the former robust IWT under significant pressure, while adding to overall bilateral tensions (Buzan 
et al. 1998: 201;; Turton, 2003: 76;; Sinha et al. 2012: 741;; Briscoe, 2013).  
 
As an analysis of the ??????institutional performance is not the aim of this thesis, I refrain from a detailed 
explanation of the official objections- and counter claims regarding the dispute. Suffice to say, official 
Pakistani objections regarded practical design specifications of 
the dam (Bakshi & Trivedi, 2011: 19;; see also Table 4) in which 
especially the height of spillways and level of intake were 
emphasized, as the planned level were perceived to enable 
India to block the water flow (Sinha, 2006: 606-607;; Salman, 
2008: 109).  
 
Whereas Pakistan pursued a political/legally strategy based on 
?????????????????????????????????????????????characterized the 
matter a simple technical dispute based on different 
Table 3: Overall Securitization of Water 
Table 4: Official Objections of Baglihar 
(Derived from Bakshi & Trivedi, 2011: 19) 
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interpretations of the ?????????practical requirements (Dar, 2011-2012: 12). Nevertheless, political driven 
hidden agendas were undeniably equally influencing Indian and Pakistani attitudes, likely fostered in part by 
the increased South-Asian hydro-political securitization (Turton, 2003;; R. Singh, 2008).  
 
While Pakistan was informed about the Baglihar project in 1991 (which they immediately contested), actual 
construction was kept secret until 2001 (Hazarika & Mehta, 2014: 32;; Refseth, 2013: 33). Article VII[2] of 
the IWT states that both signatories are required to inform one-another of hydrological plans which could 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????uld affect the other 
?????????????????? ??????????????Treaty, 1960: 15). However, since India claimed that the project did not 
interfere with Pakistani water-flows, it did not feel obliged to inform the latter (Salman, 2008: 109). Thus, 
influenced by insecurity stemming partly from its lower-riparian anxiety, the Pakistani objections was 
arguably fuelled by the level of secrecy displayed by India - a common hegemonic securitizing move within 
the HSC (Tadjabaksh, 2011: 10-11;; Turton, 2003: 52, 90). Certainly ???????? ?????????????????? ?????? ???
characterized as an attempt ??? ??????? ?????????? ??? ???????? ??? ????????????? ????????????? ???????????????
????????? ?????? ????? ????????? ??????? ?? ???????? ???????? ?????? ???????????? ??? ????? ??? ?????? ???? ???
consequently securitiz??????????????????????????????????????????????Indeed, the practice of withholding data is 
a common indicator of increased water securitization, strategically applied by the hegemon within the HSC 
(Buzan et al. 1998: 90;; Turton, 2003: 93). Accordingly, Pakistan has frequently accused India of only 
providing low-quality and incomplete data (Bagla, 2010: 1227;; Khalid et al. 2014: 271).  
 
Certainly, when water becomes securitized it is raised to a national security concern (Buzan et al. 1998: 24-
25;; Emmers, 2013: 135-136) which explains ?????[t]he Indian government protects [water-flow data] like a 
?????? ???????? ???????? ?????? ?????? The fact that secrecy indicates increasing hydro-political securitization 
(Buzan et al. 1998: 90) was evident by the following actions of India and Pakistan: Driven by (in)security, 
Pakistan feared that Baglihar would give India control of vital water supplies, therefore demanded to 
inspect the Baglihar construction site (BBC, 2005;; Briscoe, 2010a;; Sinha, 2006: 607). In turn, India 
categorically refused this request by declaring that construction were within the ??????????isions, thereby 
clearly illustrating the need for secrecy (Wirsing & Jasparro, 2006: 4;; Salman, 2008: 109;; Dar, 2011-2012: 9). 
Following three years of intense negotiations, a team of Pakistani scientists were finally allowed to visit the 
dam, which then was well under construction (Mohanty & Khan, 2005: 3156-3157;; Sinha, 2006: 608).  
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Pakistani Speech Acts and Practices 
As a recent regional study finds, ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
? ???? ??? ?? ????????? ????????? ????????? ???? ????? ??????? ????????? ???????? ???????? ??????????? ?????? ????
????????????????????????? et al. 2011: 19). This mistrust is clearly visible in Pakistani elite-discourses: For 
instance, the Secretary of Water & Power s?????? ????? ????? ????????????? ?????????? ???????? ???? ???????
withhold [water] during shortage and release it during excess [which is] the precise opposite of what the 
?????? ??????????????????????????? (Sahai, 2006). Moreover, referring to Baglihar, Dawn (2005a) quoted an 
anonyms top-official ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????statements display the evident Pakistani fear of Indian control of shared waters, arguably 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
The general view in Islamabad was that India was a? ???? ??????????????exacerbat[e] the country's dire 
water shortages [while] choking its agricultural productio?? ???? ???????? ????????????? ??????????? ???????
Moreover, Pakistani water-expert Gazdar argued that ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???? ?????????? ????????? ??? ???? ????????? ??????????? ???? ?????????? ?????????? ??? ?????????? ????????? ?????? 
Regionally discontent was also voiced: The PM of Pakistani-controlled J&K asked whether ????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????
He also hinted that Indian hydro-manipulation ????????????????????????????????Many people say that in 
the future wars may be fought over water. You cannot ignore that because the whole economy of Pakistan 
??? ????????? ??????? ???? ?????? ????? ?????? ?????????????? ?Ibid.). Previously, the PM had already linked 
water-disputes to economic security by ?????????????????he Pakistani economy is dependent on agriculture 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????
to Kashmir, one could assume that the PM sought to gain increased support from the Pakistani center 
21(E&P Weekly, 2005: 588).   
 
Pakistani securitizing moves are indeed visible, manifesting as policy makers linked Baghlihar to the actual 
survival of Pakistan, mainly by situating water within the economic-environmental-security nexus (Khan, 
2013: 213). Moreover, elites exploited the embedded South-Asian animosity by stressing the strategic risks 
of Indian water control (Bisht, 2011: 5). As mentioned, the usual referent object of the environmental 
                                                                                                                    
21  The  linkage  between  Kashmir  and  the  Baglihar  dam  will  be  revisited  further  on.    
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sector is easily identifiable and of great popular value (Aradau, 2004: 400). Hence, linking Baglihar to 
environmental decline and economic degradation was a rational choice considering these ?facilitating 
conditions??(Buzan et al. 1998: 31-33).  
 
By framing water scarcity as an existential threat, actors potentially gain political momentum, removes 
checks and balances while diverting attention away from domestic inequalities (Wæver, 1995: 221;; 2012: 53;; 
Buzan et al. 1998: 23-25;; Emmers, 2013: 135-136). This explains why Pakistani elites increasingly situate 
water-politics in a militarized security-discourse which potentially could be ??detrimental to the prospect 
??? ?? ???????????? ????????????? ???????? ?????? ???? ?????????? ???????? ?????? ??-16). Consequently, 
responsibility of domestic environmental (mis)management is diverted by politically situating water-woes 
??in the language of security vis-à-vis ???????????????????????????????? (Sinha, et al. 2012: 742;; see also Alam 
et al. 2011: 28)22. Indeed, Pervez (2013) finds via an investigation of elite-speeches, that the enduring rivalry 
??? ??????????????? ???????? ??? ???? ??????? ???????? ?????????? ???? ?????????? ??? ?? ????????? ???????? ????????
???????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 44). Applying the theoretical 
framework of ST to the empirical data as described in the above section, unquestionably reveals motives 
for Pakistani securitization of the Baglihar dispute.  
 
Indian Speech Acts and Practices  
According to Balzacq (2011), securitization is not only limited to discourses, but is also present in non-
discursive means, thereby offering an alternate analytical framework involving practices and contexts alike 
(2011: 2-3). As previously explained, this approach is highly appropriate for this analysis, as Indian 
discourses do not reveal many significant attempts of traditional discursive securitization. Nevertheless, 
Indian security-practices do expose securitizing dynamics within the HSC: As securitization is never a static 
process (Balzacq, 2005: 172), such attempts are unveiled only by exploring Indian security-practices, while 
also including the wider environmental-political-security context (Jones, 2011: 409;; Balzacq, 2011: 2;; Curley 
& Herrington, 2011: 142-143, 147-149). Although acknowledging the prominence of ST, Balsacq (2011) 
still contends that while ??discursive practices are important in explaining how some security problems 
originate, many develop with ??????? ??? ??????????????????????? ??????? ???? thereby necessitating an analytical 
                                                                                                                    
22   Moreover,   the   Pakistani   army   has   consolidated   its   power   through   the   notion   of   acting   as   a   bulwark   against   the   Indian   threat   (Aqil,   2014:   256;  
Tadjabaksh,  2011:  21-­‐22;  Nasr,  2005:  186).  
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inclusion of  contexts and practices. In the following section, an emphasis on Indian hydrological practices, 
as evidence of securitizing moves, will be emphasized.  
 
While continuously linking Baglihar to Kashmiri developmental needs, India remained steadfast that 
constructions were within the ??????provisions (Ford, 2006;; Sinha, 2006: 606-607). For instance, N. Singh, 
the Indian External Affairs Minister said that ????e cannot agree because the project is important for the 
economic well-being of the people of J&K????????????????????????????????????????, India found Pakistani 
??????????? ????????? ??? ???????? ???? ??? ???? ????????? official (Wirsing & Jasparro, 2006: 6). Singh 
reiterated this view, stating that ??Pakistan's fears that Baglihar will give India the capability to either 
?????? ?????? ???????? ??? ??? ????????? ?????? ???? ??????????? ??????????? ???????????? ??? ??????? ???????
Evidently, policy makers did not explicitly frame water-issues with Pakistan as an existential threat. 
However, because the hydro-hegemon often utilizes its advantageous geographical (and material) position 
in bilateral negotiations, it is not dependent on traditional securitizing speech acts (Zeitoun & Warner, 
2006: 445, 447, 450). Thus, I contend that the Indian hydraulic mission can be characterized as an 
observable practice- ???????????????????????????????????????????understood as an elite securitizing move, 
infused with iconic and symbolic power and discursively linked to national, political, social and economic 
wellbeing (PRIO, 2011: 2;; Sinha, 2014: 58).  The practice of constructing hydro-power projects in J&K 
surely influenced the regional conflict, which was only intensified by ??????? justifying actions (Alam et al. 
2011: 18):  By imposing its will on the lesser riparian, discursively justified through a developmental 
discourse, India only fuelled the HSC. Indeed, the linkages between water-security and national 
development are one ?????????????? ??? ???????? ??????????????????? ??? ????????????? ??increased centralized 
control of the rivers, enforced secrecy measures, selective data gathering and a tendency to design statistics 
?????????????????????????? ???? ???????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????? ??
????????? ???????? ???? ?????????????? ??????????? ?????, 2011: 11). These outcomes translate directly into the 
aforementioned vested interests of elites as described by Pervez (2013).  
 
By securitizing water, politicians can frame the inter-???????????????????????????????????????-related issue 
to fit other pol??????? ??????????? ??????????????????? ?????? ????? For instance, the abysmal state of urban 
infrastructures combined with intense population growth, have severely affected water quantity/quality, 
waste management etc., but the issue is mostly ignored at both federal- and state level, as necessary reforms 
would likely be costly hence political unpopular (Miklian & Kolås, 2014: 3;; see also Box 3 and 7).  
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Therefore I contend that the hydraulic mission, accepted by the public through securitization, possibly 
sought to directly link state building activities to water, thereby legitimizing Indian elites themselves while 
diverting attention away from domestic (mis)management (PRIO 2011: 2, 10-12). Undeniably, the 
utilization of securitization is one effective ?hegemonic compliance-producing-mechanism? in which state 
??????? ???????? ??a project to a national-security concern [which] equates criticism to treason, thus 
silencing critical voices in the bureaucracy ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????un 
& Warner, 2006: 448).  
 
These attempts at ?hegemonic control? are certainly happening on the Indus, partly motivated by the 
various environmental pressures previously mentioned (Alam et al. 2011: 119;; IBWG, 2013: 16). Moreover, 
???????? ?????????? ??????? is arguably driven by ???? ????????????? ???????? ?????? ???????? ???? ?????????
?????????? ?????????? ?????-?????? ??????????? ???????? ???? ?????? ?????? ??????? ?????? ???? Traditionally 
understood as a symbol of modernization and development (Veileux et al. 2014: 7), the production of 
hydraulic infrastructure legitimizes the state through declared efforts towards domestic improvement, 
which in India manifest in the construction of large-scale dams (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006: 444;; see also 
Bhuta, 2011;; Jayaram, 2013). Indeed, in their respective research on Indian security politics, Miklian and 
Kolås (2014) explain that the process of building dams and barrages has long been a sign of state-efficiency 
(2014: 8), just as Sinha (2014) notes that a stable supply of water, linked to the political, social and 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
Summarization: Dynamics of the Hydrological Security Complex at Display  
Evidently, Pakistani elites simultaneously scapegoated India while framing it a potential threat, thereby 
diverting popular attention away from domestic inequalities (Bisht, 2013: 15-16;; Tadjabaksh, 2011: 21-22). 
As the theory holds, environmental securitization indeed often spills into other sectors by assigning 
responsibility of domestic ecological stress to a tangible object, generally already negatively perceived 
(Buzan et al. 1998: 84). Regarding the facilitating conditions, by linking water-scarcity to security-relations 
with India, securitization was furthermore undeniably more easily accepted (Sinha et al. 2012: 742). 
Moreover, I contend that the inherent importance of security politics, and the popular value of the 
environmental/economic referent object, also assisted this process (Soroos, 1994: 321). As Indian security-
practices were repeatedly perceived/framed as ????????????????????????????????dynamics can definitely be 
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observed. Therefore I conclude, similar to Pervez?? (2013) findings, that the current (hydrological) security 
dilemma is (re)produced by Indian and Pakistani elites motivated by the instrumental political value of 
securitization (2013: 44-45;; see also Bisht, 2011;; Tadjabaksh, 2011: Burgess et al. 2013).   
 
As argued, the securitizing dynamics of the HSC are clearly visible in the Baglihar dispute: The increased 
securitization of water led hydro-hegemonic India to ensure water-resources through dam constructions 
(Zeitoun & Warner, 2006: 444) and lower-riparian Pakistan to object to all such attempts (IDSA, 2010: 39).  
Resulting in zero-sum perceptions, framing water as a national concern in addition (partly) diverted 
attention away from domestic issues (Bisht, 2011, 5-6-, 15-16;; Miklian & Kolås, 2014;; 3). This conclusion 
fits well into ????????????????????????????????insecurity indeed often grows with prospects of basin closure 
within the HSC - fuelled by the wider political context thereby consequently paving way for increased 
securitization, which in turn influences future political decision-making (2003: 8, 69, 95). Table 5 
summarizes the securitizing moves of both countries in the initial stage of the dispute: 
 
 
3.3. Third-Party Involvement and Linkages to Kashmir  
In accordance with official policies, India repeatedly attempted only bilateral solutions to the Baglihar 
dispute (NWP, 2002: 12). However, following a high-level meeting in Islamabad in 2003, this strategy 
finally came to an end as Pakistan remained firm that they would only resume bilateral talks following the 
immediate stop of the Baglihar construction (Reddy, 2003;; Dawn, 2005a). This ultimatum was promptly 
refused by India, leading Pakistan to subject the matter to third-party arbitration as stipulated within Article 
Table 5: Securitizing Moves, Initial Stage 
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IX[2A] of the IWT (Dawn, 2005a;; Indus Water Treaty, 1960: 18). In January 2005 Pakistan officially 
requested a Neutral Expert (NE), resulting in the appointment of Swiss engineer Lafitte. For the first time, 
the riparian neighbors were unable to bilaterally solve hydrological disputes, thereby revealing the impeding 
effects of increased water-securitization within the South-Asian HSC (Sinha et al. 2012: 741;; Burgess et al. 
2013: 13). As repeatedly mentioned, the rivalry is continuously (re)produced by elite security discourses and 
practices partly motivated by personal political interests (Pervez, 2013: 44). Hence, I contend that the 
inherent dynamics of the HSC hindered possible bilateral cooperation, visible in the pursuit of zero-sum 
solutions and ultimatums. As will be revealed in the follow section, especially Kashmir proved an 
irreconcilable issue between India and Pakistan, severely affecting hydrological relations.  
 
As explained, the conflicting positions regarding Kashmir remain the most encumbering issue in the Indo-
Pakistani enduring rivalry (Saideman, 2005: 202-203;; Cohen, 2013: 33). Indeed, the disputed region was the 
main driver in all 11 major conflicts between the two states (Gleditsch et al. 2002: 631). Moreover, as the 
Indus passes through the region, Kashmiri-disputes have also taken a hydro-strategic turn (Ahmad, 2009). 
According to research, water is certainly d?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????Burgess et al. 2013: 15;; see also, R. Singh, 2008: 10, 15). For instance, Waslekar (2005) 
connects declining Pakistani water-availability to growing Kashmiri insurgency activities (2005: 57). 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????-resources as a motivation for the 2001 Kargil War 
(Swain, 2004;; Waslekar, 2005;; Baid, 2005). For India, hydrological control of J&K is equally about military 
advantage and securing domestic energy resources (Zawahri, 2009: 5;; Wirsing & Jasparro, 2006: 5-6).  
 
Hence, Kashmir undeniably remains key in Indian-Pakistani hydrological disputes (Dar, 2010-2011: 2;; 
Sinha, 2010: 483), in which Baglihar moreover played an influential part. Furthermore, the Kashmiri 
population also deserves analytical attention, as Baglihar proved a doubled-edged sword by simultaneously 
promising to fulfill regional electrical needs, but consequently also severely impeding agricultural 
development (Alam et al. 2011: 15;; Gilani, 2005: 46). Therefore, regional ambivalence towards the hydro-
???????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(Alam et al. 2011: 15).  
 
Since Pakistani General Musharraf rose to power in 2004, the irredentist claim to Kashmir transformed 
from integrating the Muslim majority within the region with Pakistan, to securing vital water resources 
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from the Indus (Waslekar, 2005;; Bisht, 2011: 2, 7). Moreover, by emphasizing water Pakistani elites 
attempted to increase waning domestic and international attention towards the region, just as linking J&K 
to domestic water-scarcity motivated insurgents serving Pakistani interests by maintaining instability and 
insecurity (IDSA, 2010: 38). This strategy was highlighted by water-expert Dr. Ejaz in Daily Times??????nless 
Pakistan is assured on the supply of water, it will never abandon the proxies that can keep India on its toes 
by destab????????????????? ?????????????????????? ????????????????????????? as important as the water 
??????? ?????????Furthermore, the President of the Pakistani Muslim League was quoted in Dawn (2008a) 
describing Kashmir itself as the lifeline for the country, while saying that Baglihar had severely reduced the 
water flow to Pakistan. In addition, he stressed the declining water situation in the Northern Punjab 
province, thereby linking Baglihar to domestic water-scarcity all the while emphasizing the importance of 
Kashmir (Ibid.). Members of the Regional Assembly attempted similar securitizing attempts, passing a 
resolution denying Indian trade transit prior to any resolution to both Kashmir and water allocation issues 
(IDSA, 2010: 37). Moreover, one member was quoted for saying that India would remain ?an enemy? until 
both the Kashmir dispute and water issues were resolved, thereby yet again connecting the two issues 
(Dawn, 2010).   
 
I contend that by linking domestic water-scarcity to Baglihar, environmental responsibility was shifted 
from Pakistan to India, while constructing t????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
security-responses beyond normal politics (Wæver, 1995: 221;; 2012: 53;; Buzan et al. 1998: 23-25;; see also 
Figure 1). As explained, Pakistani elites thus gained ?poli?????? ?????????? ??? ????ving checks and 
balances, while diverting attention away from domestic inequalities (Emmers, 2013: 135-136). Indeed, Bisht 
?????????????????????[l]inking Kashmir to water suits the interests of political parties in as much as it helps 
divert debate away from inequitable land holdings, water scarcity, poor water policies and provincial 
???????????????????????????????????????? 
 
Therefore, these practices indeed make sense, as observers have explained how especially corruption and 
??administrative inefficiencies in ??????????????????????????????????????????????????? water development 
in the country and stunted growth ???????????????????????????????????????????? Hence, inspired by Practice 
Theory- and event analysis, it is by combining the expressions of national identity with actual observable 
events or aspects of action, I can contend that the larger social structures in Pakistan influence individual 
political decision-making (Rouse, 2007: 505;; Commuri, 2009: 162).  Moreover, I argue that connecting 
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domestic water-scarcity to Baglihar, while linking this to the larger Kashmir dispute, was an overt elite 
securitizing attempt poised to rekindle fading Pakistani public interest in the region. By successfully linking- 
and securitizing Pakistani water-woes to Indian hydro-logical constructions and J&K, elites attempted to 
transform the liberation struggle ????????? ????????? ???????? ??? ??? ???????????? ????????? ???????????????????
(Tadjabaksh: 2011: 10). If successful, popular attention would in theory be directed away from domestic 
mismanagements, especially in the Northern provinces (Chandran, 2010;; Bisht, 2011: 9, 13). Indeed, as 
???????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????provide much 
needed water for irrigation to Punjab and Sindh and alleviate tensions ????????????????????????????????????
5). Thus, Pakistani motivations for securitizing the water-scarcity-Baglihar-Kashmir nexus are unveiled. 
These findings correspond with especially Pervez?? (2013) conclusion regarding South-Asi?????????? vested 
interests in maintaining the security dilemma/HSC.   
 
Similar to Indian practices in the initial stages, Kashmir-linkages are less visible in the military/political 
sectors, but rather situated within an economic/development discourse. This was achieved mainly by 
emphasizing the prospective prosperity for the Kashmiris. For instance, in referring to Baglihar PM Singh 
?????????????[E]lectricity is crucial for the development of industry and the project will give a push to the 
industrializat?????????????????????????????????However, as one Indian think-tank report argued, rather 
than for the development of J&K, ????????????????????????????????????????? purely geo-strategic driven23 (R. 
Singh, 2008: 16).  
 
Moreover, economic incentives of private actors and regional state-governments possibly influenced 
central policy-making as well (Alam et al. 2011: 16). While justified by meeting domestic developmental 
needs, hydrological power-projects have often been criticized by local actors and experts for the disparity 
??between claims and actual results/impacts on the ground (PRIO, 2011: 7). This can partly be 
contributed ????? ???????????? of water???????????????? the fact that in South-Asia (and especially India) 
huge transnational water companies have increasingly gained influence ? or control ? of water resources. 
This consequently infuse hydro-politics with enormous sums, potentially resulting in widespread 
corruption (R. Singh, 2008: 19;; Dar, 2011-2012: 21-23;; see also Box 3).  Still, India unquestionably needed 
                                                                                                                    
23  For  instance,  the  report  explains  that  earlier  hydrological  power  projects,  equally  justified  through  a  domestic  developmental  discourse,  actually  held  
no  benefits  for  local  populations  (R.  Singh,  2008:  16.).    
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to appease the Kashmiri population ?????????????????????????????????????????? For instance, Baglihar was 
vital for meeting In???????????????????????????????- a recurring source of domestic discontent (Zawahri, 2009: 
13).  Other economic motives were probably influencing decision-making as well, e.g. expansion of 
tourism (Mushtaq, 2010). This particular endeavor certainly necessitates regional appeasement, something 
which Baglihar arguably was meant to instigate by meeting Kashmiri developmental needs.  
 
In summing up, albeit overtly motivated by economic incentives, Kashmir is still high on the Indian 
national security-agenda (Zawahri, 2009: 5). However, as the undisputed hegemon, India continuous to 
enjoy the status quo within the region (Paul, 2005: 10), which explains why only few explicit securitizing 
moves within the military/national sectors are visible in discourses involving Kashmir.  India instead 
repeatedly situated Baglihar within the economic sector, emphasizing the developmental benefits for the 
Kashmiri population (IDSA, 2010: 38). For instance, the Indian Extern Affairs Minister denied to concede 
????????????? ??????????? ??? ??the project [was] important for the economic well-being of the people of 
????? ???????????? ??? ??????? ????????oreover, ??????? ???? ?????? ?????????????? ??? ?????? ????? ????? the 
??effort has been to build the socio-economic infrastructure of the state to make Jammu and Kashmir 
???????? ???????????????????????? ??????????????????Furthermore????????????? ??????????????????????or all 
our commitments to the State [and] ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
2008). Arguably, ????????????????????????????????????? situated within a legitimizing discourse of ensuring 
economic well-being for the Kashmiris ? which, as explained above, has not always held true. Finally, Singh 
noted that special care had been taken to ensure that Pakistani concerns were addressed (The News, 2008). 
However, discontent did manifest from both ?????????????????????????? nitpicking under the ambit of the 
??????????????????????????????rom Kashmiri elites themselves, disaffected with the IWT in general and the 
Baglihar project in particular (Misra, 2010: 184).   
 
Already in 1999, ?????????????? ????????had referred to the I????????????????????while saying ???????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????? 
2000). Moreover, in April 2002 the J&K Legislative Assembly demanded ???????????????? on the grounds 
of unequal water-distribution (Dawn, 2002). This position was continuously reiterated: For instance, the 
head of J&K Council for Human Rights ??????? ????? ???? ???? ???? ??????????? ???? ????????? ?????mic 
development (Gilani, 2010). Likewise, many local experts conte????? ????? ???? ???????????????? ??? ????
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economic woes of the people of upstream Jammu and Kashmir State by depriving them of the legitimate 
right to full usage of ??????????????????????????????????? ??????????????? 
 
Clearly there were differing views on who actually reaped the benefits from Baglihar: While India 
attempted to frame the issue as meeting regional demands of environmental scarcity, Pakistan feared the 
increased control of water-headways in J&K (R. Singh, 2008: 15;; Dar, 2011-2012: 9). Moreover, the 
Kashmiris themselves emphasized the unequal distribution of resources from Baglihar, which they 
perceived having legitimate priority-rights to (Gilani, 2010). These views explain the various manifestations 
of securitizing attempts, which I contend are furthermore influenced by the various positions within the 
HSC, i.e. hydro-hegemon, lower-riparian and native population respectively. Yet again, I reiterate how such 
dynamics only become apparent by adopting a contextual understanding of the security practices driven 
simultaneously by the  wider supra-national settings and inter-subjective identity-based perceptions 
(Balzacq, 2005, 2011;; Rouse, 2007;; Commuri, 2009;; Jones, 2011;; Curley & Herrington, 2011). Moreover, it 
clearly depicts how negotiations take a zero-sum character fostered by the increasing securitization of 
hydro-politics.   Table 6 summarizes the securitizing dynamics of the HSC in the Kashmir context:  
 
 Table 6: Securitization in J&K 
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3.4. Post-Settlement ? A Conflict Less Solved   
Following numerous visits to Baglihar, the NE presented his decision in 2007 (Sinha et al. 2012: 741). This 
can briefly be summarized as a general compromise which left both parties officially satisfied24 (Salman, 
2008: 115;; Bakshi & Trivedi, 2011: 19).  However, in a subsequent press briefing the Pakistani Minister for 
Water and Power reiterated Pakistani concerns of ????????????????????????? ??????????????, saying that the 
??government is fully committed to protect Pakistan's national interest and is examining further course of 
???????? (Times of India, 2007;; see also Mohanty & Khan, 2005: 3156). Although officially settled, the 
Baglihar dispute was evidently not resolved.  
 
At the inaugural ceremony in October 2008, PM Singh yet again linked Baglihar to the economic sector by 
emphasizing the developmental benefits for J&K (GK News, 2008). Moreover, the PM said that by 
????????? ??? ????? ??????????? ???????? ??????? ????? given due consideration to the genuine concern of the 
neighboring country [having] vowed to completely ?????? ??? ????? ? ???????? ???????? ??bid.). Singh also 
emphasized the mutual duty of common development, and was ?????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Indian hegemonic practices, in 
which securitizing moves of constructing dams are discursively justified.  By linking the Baglihar dam to 
development, while explicitly stating that constructions were ??????????????????????????s, India arguably 
imposed its will on Pakistan through ?legitimate political means?. Indeed, utilizing legal interpretations are a 
common hydro-hegemonic practice deployed to ?????????? ?????????? ???????? ????? ?????? ?????????? ???
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????? Moreover, 
while officially emphasizing cooperation, the hegemon distorts the negative effects of asymmetrical power 
??????????????? ?????? ??? ??evident in structural inequalities, the lack of control over decisions and an 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????toun & Warner, 2006: 440).  
 
Nevertheless, I contend that the securitization of water led Pakistani officials to unremittingly view 
Baglihar as an existential threat, hence the explanation why they abstained from conforming- or accepting 
further Indian hydrological practices. Combining the wider contexts i.e. the political domestic climate of 
Pakistan with an understanding of the potential benefits of successful hydrological securitization and 
                                                                                                                    
24  ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????  to  the  Baglihar  Dam,  see  Khattak,  2008.  For  a  
similar  comprehensive  analysis  of  the  dispute  itself  and  the  resolution  process,  see  Salman,  2008.        
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scapegoating, allows me to formulate reasonable conclusions as to why Pakistani elites refused to accept 
the Baglihar dispute settled.  In contrast, Indian policy-makers viewed the conflict as over (Khattak, 2008: 
97-98). Moreover, experts argued that Pakistani objections were strictly politically driven which reflected 
???? ?????????? ??propensity to resort to horror scenarios and grandstanding [while] suggesting political 
????? ????? ???????? ?????? ??????? ??? ???? ????? ??????????? ???????? ??????????? ??????? ? ??? ??? Sinha (2010) 
contended, whereas ??India [had] been sincere in following the terms of the treaty, as the Baglihar case 
??????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????? 
 
Immediately following the inauguration, Pakistani officials voiced complaints that the filling of Baglihar did 
not adhere to the IWT. The Pakistani Indus Commissioner pointed to the reduced Pakistani water-intake, 
which ???????????????????????-???????????????????????????????????????????????????More forcefully, President 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????? ??????? ????? ???? ??????? ??????? ?????????????? ?????? Demanding compensation for the reduced 
water flow, Zadari also hinted that the Baglihar-dispute could significantly impact overall Indo-Pakistani 
relations (Ibid. 2008). During this tense post-settlement period, India chose to fill the dam without warning 
in August 2008 (Hazarika & Mehta, 2008: 27). This practice was perceived by Pakistan as a clear violation 
of the IWT, thereby re-fuelling the fear and anxiety of Pakistani officials concerned with the military-
strategic utility of Baglihar (Dawn, 2008b;; Briscoe, 2010a;; Bagla, 2012: 1227). For instance, as the filling 
had adversely effects on the farmers in Pakistani Punjab, Indian actions played straight into perceptions of 
lower-riparian vulnerabilities (Briscoe, 2010a;; Hazarika & Mehta, 2014: 26). Moreover, as India kept the 
filling secret, it illustrates the securitization of hydro-politics through classification of hydrological data and 
especially practices (Turton, 2003: 52;; R. Singh, 2008: 16).  
 
Indeed, as Turton (2003) explains, in declining river basins, data and knowledge become ????????????s of 
???????????fostering conditions where ??knowledge is power, and it is wielded like a weapon to achieve and 
????????????????????????????????????????Certainly, a shared ????????????????????????????????? been that 
??????????????maintains utmost secrecy about any facts/figures/data regarding trans-bound???????????????
Singh, 2008: 16). These criticisms are continuously paralleled by many experts, all calling for more 
transparent Indian practice regarding river-flood data at their dams (e.g. Briscoe, 2010b: 32).   
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Indian post-settlement hydro-practices were unmistakably visibly securitized by Pakistani elites. Moreover 
these moves were clearly intensified by explicitly hinting at armed escalation: For instance, Dawn quoted 
the former Pakistani Foreign Minister in January 2010 for saying ????? ??? ???????? continues to deny 
Pakistan its due share, it can lea????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Similar linkages between water and war was made by the influential Pakistani Chief Editor Nizami, who 
warned that the Indian hydrological projects would turn Pakistan into ??a desert within the next 10 to 15 
??????? ??????? ????). Moreover, he added that the country ??????? ??????? ??????? ???????? ???????? ???
?????????? ???????? ???? ?? ????????????? ????????? ???????Members of the Punjab Assembly were particular 
verbal in criticizing the Baglihar ???????????????????????????? ??????????????????????, 2011: 11). One member 
was quoted in the Daily Times for saying that ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????37-??????????????????????????????
National Assembly, the government was urged by several MPs to impress on India not to use the Pakistani 
???????????????????????????????????? 
 
Notably, these intensified securitizing moves all occurred following President Za????????????????????????
???????? ??????????? ?????????? ????????? ??? ??????? ????? ?????????????? ??????? ??? ????????? ??? ????????? ??????? ???
??????????????? ??????? ?????????? ?????????????? ?? ???????? ????? ???????????????? ???????????????????????? a 
new beginning in the water discourse vis-a-vis India. Similarly, Bisht (2011) concludes that the ????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ing water discourse in Pakistan 
??????????? ??????????????? ??????????????? ????????????????? ???????? ?????? ???????????? ????????????????????
securitization of water can therefore ??? ??????? ???????????? ??? ???? ???????????????? ????????? ??? ?????????????
????????????????????????????? ?????-subjectively accepted by the general audience. The rather undisputed 
nature of Pakistani hydrological securitization supports this argument. Moreover, the explicit, and apparent 
unproblematic referrals to (nuclear)war highlight the dynamics of successful securitization, in which the 
implementation of extraordinary (counter)measures are popular (Buzan et al. 1998: 25-26). Moreover, 
recalling the political momentum gained by successful securitization (Emmers, 2013: 135-136), I argue that 
the intensification of hydrological securitization helped to further divert domestic discontent ? all in the 
interests of certain parts of the political elites (see e.g. Box 4 and 8).       
 
Inspired by the geographical-positional assumptions of HSC theory, I contend that lower-riparian Pakistan 
was partly driven by ?????????????????????????? to strengthen its own position on the Indus (IDSA, 2010: 
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32;; Bisht, 2011: 12;; Briscoe, 2010a). This consequentially led elites to object any potential Indian 
hydrological constructions (Bakshi & Trivedi, 2011: 22;; Sinha, 2010: 484-485).  
 
In contrast, Indian securitization can be interpreted as a hydro-hegemonic resource capture strategy, 
simultaneously aiming to fully exploit the Indus potential, while achieving political momentum through 
national development projects (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006: 444;; PRIO, 2011: 2). Conclusively, both India 
and Pakistan were driven by the increasing securitization of water within the HSC, in which their respective 
positions also influenced discourses and practices alike. Common for both nations were the invariable 
linkage of water-scarcity to national security, while Pakistan moreover repeatedly connected domestic 
water-woes to Indian hydro-practices.  
 
Linking resource-scarcity and environmental problems with security is never innocent, because the 
particular referent objects are almost always recognizable and pivotal for audiences (Wæver, 1995: 55;; 
Aradau, 2004: 400). Therefore, this practice may yield unintended effects, as the inherent importance of 
security politics often bolsters nationalism or ?undemocratic tendencies of secrecy?? while centralizing 
power and exclude competing political groups from decision-making procedures (Soroos, 1993: 321;; 
Wæver, 1995: 221). ?????????? ???? ?????????????? ??????? ???????? ?????? ???? ?????????? ??????? ??????? ????
inter-subjectively reinforced, further facilitated securitization (Pervez, 2013: 3,26;; Buzan, 2002: 21-22). 
Indeed, as the intersubjective process is a foundation of ST (Buzan et al. 1998: 19;; Balzacq 2005: 177) 
identity logically plays a prominent part by shaping intersubjective understandings, perceptions, interests 
and behavior (Agius, 2007: 9;; Wendt, 1998: 73). This explains the political instrumental use of securitizing 
Indian hydrological practices- whether the threat was perceived ??????????????? 
 
Regardless of the actual hydrological effects, the 2008 Baglihar filling was securitized by Pakistani actors in 
general ? arguably motivated by gaining/maintaining political power and diverting attention away from 
domestic mismanagement. As I contend, the identities of both India and Pakistan are continuously shaped 
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
as the above analysis has shown, increasingly these security practices links easily identifiable and valued 
referent objects to larger patterns of national security, thereby further fuelling regional enmity, which 
indeed are in the interests of certain elements of the political elites in India and Pakistan alike. 
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4.  CONCLUSIONS  
??? ????? ?????? ?????? ?? ???????? ???? ??????? research question, that is, explain what the actual securitizing 
elements within the Baglihar dispute were, and what these elements reveal about the larger dynamics 
driving the South-Asian HSC. Moreover, I suggests venues for further research, emphasizing the 
imperative need for de-securitizing the Indo-Pakistani enduring rivalry.   
 
The Baglihar dispute was a turning point in Indo-Pakistani hydrological relations. Although avoiding armed 
escalation (partly due to the institutional setting and third-party intervention) it clearly ????????????????? 
weakness vis-à-vis opportunistic actors by ???????????????????????????????????????????????????Sinha et al. 
2012: 744). Moreover, based on my theoretical assumptions and data investigated, I contend that Baglihar 
exemplifies the overall consequences of increased water-securitization in the South-Asian HSC (Turton, 
2003:69-73;; R. Singh, 2008: 7-8). As reiterated throughout this thesis, the successful securitization of 
specific issues liberate policy-makers from traditional political responsibilities, thereby certainly making the 
strategy seem appealing for self-serving political elites (Buzan et al. 1998: 24;; Emmers, 2013: 136-137). 
Problematically, securitization likely produces unfavorable societal effects e.g. creating antagonistic 
perceptions ??? ????? ?????? while fostering a climate of zero-sum negotiations, which aggregated move 
??????????????????????????? ?????????? ??????????? ?????????? ????????? ????? ????????????????????????? ????
?????????????????et al. 2011: 40).  
 
Hence, within ST analysis, hydrological disputes should be given considerable more attention, as especially 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????? ??????? ????????? ??? ?????? ????????? (Buzan et al. 1998: 84). These securitizing dynamics were 
certainly present in the Baglihar dispute, especially concerning referent objects dearly held and easily 
identifiable by civil-societies (Aradau, 2004: 400). This finding corresponds with contemporary South-
Asian research, which argue that in the region ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??
state actors as well for purposes of political positioning, to fuel hatred and conflict, phenomena witnessed 
around the world and in the re???????Alam et al. 2011: 40). The increasing securitization of water in South-
Asia can be understood from several perspectives: As mentioned, many observers regard Pakistani 
??????????????? ??? ???????? ?????-projects as a means to diminish domestic discontent while justifying 
increased militarization. Indeed, Bisht (2011) explains that  ??????????? ?? ????????? ????????? ?????? ??? ????
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domestic public has been considered as one of the main factors in strengthening the national power of the 
????????? ???????? ?????? ??). While indicating the effects of increasing environmental vulnerability 
(Tadjabaksh, 2011: 10), I nevertheless argue that Pakistani discursive practices can be understood as a 
function of the likely opportunities gained by successful securitization. Given the costs of addressing 
various domestic issues, ???????? ?????? ??? ?????? ???? ??? ?????????? ?????? ???????? ??an influential role in 
shaping the contours of Pakistan?s foreign policy objectives vis-a-vis India? (Bisht, 2011: 13). Similar 
domestic water woes are taking place in India, where civil strife and corruption also fuel national discontent 
(Buzan, B. 2002: 7;; Miklian & Kolås. 2014: 1, 4). Thus, the hegemonic resource capture strategy, inherent 
with the likely state-legitimizing outcome, can equally be understood as motivation for Indian hydro-
securitization (PRIO, 2011: 2). Moreover, the rapid expansion of dams holds clear economic incentives for 
certain stake-holders, additionally explaining such observable Indian hydro-practices (R. Singh, 2008, Dar, 
2011-2012).  Hence, it is reasonable to argue that while India and Pakistan might have different motives for 
hydro-securitization, which explains the fluctuation in actual practices, the instrumental value of 
securitization itself is unquestionably recognized by actors within both countries. Therefore it is 
problematic that the increasing securitization, both hypothetically and empirically proven, only produces 
additional fear and hatred, consequently making stable peace in South-Asia seem as illusive as ever. In 
other words, the elite (re)produced HSC does not seem to diminish due to prospects of basin closure. 
(Tadjabaksh, 2011;; Bisht, 2011;; Pervez, 2013). In contrary, Indian-Pakistani hydrological conflicts seem 
only to increase, as even before the Baglihar settlement Pakistan launched objections towards yet another 
project ? the Kishangaga dam (Hindustan Times, 2007b).  
 
  
                                                                                       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 5: Kishangaga Dam 
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Pakistan, yet again arguably driven by lower-riparian anxiety, securitized the matter thereby dragging India 
????? ?? ????????????? ???????? ?????????? ???????? ???????? ???? ????????????? ??????? ?????? ????? In turn, India 
similarly framed the hydro-power project as a pivotal national project. This was emphasized by the 
Minister of State for Power: ?[Kishangaga is] ??? ?????????? ? ????????? ??? ??????? ??? ????? ??? ?????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????to the Baglihar-dispute, 
India again justified the hydrological mission through a developmental-national security discourse (IDSA, 
2010: 42). Similarly, Pakistan once more linked domestic water-problems to Indian hydrological 
infrastructure while stressing their military-strategic features (Hindustan Times, 2007b;; Khan, 2013: 15-16;; 
Pakistan Defense, 2014). Hence, it would seem the dynamics described in the Baglihar-dispute yet again are 
in effect, clearly illustrating the impeding effects of increased hydro-securitization and the enormous 
undertaking towards a normalization of relations.  
 
4.1. The Call for De-Securitization  
As a consequence of basin closure, insecurity invariably increases. This is only fuelled by the wider political 
context within the HSC, which in turn influence future political decision-making, consequently breeding 
even more securitization (Turton, 2003: 8, 69, 95). Hydro-hegemonic theory holds that the resource 
capture strategy indeed entails constructions of large hydro-projects, which functions as a state-legitimizing 
venture (PRIO, 2011: 2). The Baglihar- and Kishanganga projects are part of Ind????? ????????? ????????
strategy, which consequently forced an immediate reaction by Pakistan fearing increased Indian control of 
the declining Indus water resources (BBC, 2005;; Masood, 2012). These dynamics clearly portray the 
dynamics within the on-going HSCs.  
 
Under these current conditions of inherent national insecurity, Indian and Pakistani elites alike arguably 
assume the worst case scenario, thereby influencing future security-practices. According to SC theory, these 
security practices are then understood as potential threatening to the counter-part, thereby forcing the 
adoption of increased security-related measures themselves. In a South-Asian hydrological setting, these 
???????????????????????? a spiral of insecurity like the cold war era with hydraulic infrastructure replacing 
?????????????????????? et al. 2011: 37). As one possible solution, I argue for greater scholarly emphasis on 
the means and possibilities for de-securitizing the South-Asian HSC.  
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As explained, de-securitization denotes the withdrawal of specific issues ?????????????????????????????????
into the politicized level where formal bargaining processes and political accountability are in effect (Buzan 
et al. 1998:4) This transformation is indeed called for, as hydro-securitization produces several unintended 
consequences, e.g. elevating water development projects to an undebatable level while rapidly escalating 
conflict potential with probable zero-sum outcomes (Leather, 2001:131;; Turton, 2003: 113). But how is 
this process undertaken? As Turton (2003) finds, insecurity does often arise from the prospect of water-
scarcity (2003: 242)?? ????????? ????? ???? ??? ???????????? ??? ????????? ????????????? ???????????? ??? ????
dispute, by de-securi????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(Ibid. 242-243). Indeed, Barrett (1994) wrote that effective regimes assisting in the successful cooperation 
of international water resource management are critical, as water-scarcity without proper management can 
be a trigger for international riparian conflict (1994: 8).  
 
The logic of de-securitization certainly lends itself to inter-state relations, potentially transforming conflict 
to cooperation (Emmers, 2013: 137). For instance, by studying the de-securitization process in Turkey, 
Aras and Polat (2008) ?????????????formerly securitized and dramatized issues have begun to be perceived 
???????????????????????????? ??policymaking process is now emancipated from ideational barriers, while the 
??????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????25. In order for the same to happen 
in South-Asia, I argue that emerging issues of cooperation must be prevented from becoming securitized. 
If actors involved allow environmental matters to be elevated above the level of negotiated politics, then 
compromises indeed will be that more difficult to reach ????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????Olmstead, 2014).  
 
Therefore, inspired by the referred scholarship which all call for increased attention on securitizing actors 
undermining attempts at peace, I argue that a bottom-up de-securitizing process is one possibly way 
towards stable peace. This approach presumes that mid- and low-level actors would converge and 
challenge dominating views, thereby transforming the hegemonic discourses and consequently the inter-
subjective beliefs. How this is actually undertaken in practice is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, 
unveiling the obstacles to such process is one step of the way. This study, in its limited time and space, was 
meant as a contribution towards this important endeavor.    
                                                                                                                    
25   For   a   similar   argument   in   the   Israel-­‐Palestinian   context,   in   which   a   de-­‐securitization   process,   instigated   by   sub-­‐?????? ???????? ???????-­‐hegemonic  
discourses,  challenged  the  dominating  securitization  of  water  thereby  opening  up  for    the  possibility  of  a  normalization  of  relations,  see  Frölich,  2010.    
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